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ARTICLES
INFORMANTS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
A RECONSIDERATION
TRACEY MACLIN*
In many ways, Decatur, Illinois, is a typical Midwestern community. With
a population of 84,000, Decatur is located in central Illinois amid corn and
soybean fields. In one respect, however, Decatur is not like most American
towns; it is the home of Archer-Daniels-Midland ("Archer-Daniels"), one of
the world's largest agricultural companies.1 On July 10, 1995, both Archer-
Daniels and the citizens of Decatur learned that a high-flying company
executive, Mark E. Whitacre, had acted as an undercover spy for the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and provided the FBI with valuable
information about alleged price-fixing by executives of Archer-Daniels and
other grain processors.2
The FBI initially asked Whitacre to tape conversations that occurred at
company headquarters. To do this, Whitacre wore a small recorder placed
inside his coat pocket' The FBI later gave its informant a high-tech briefcase
allowing Whitacre to record dialogues wherever he went. As an informant for
the FBI, Whitacre obtained "secret tape recordings, including videotapes, of
hundreds of conversations and meetings in hotel rooms in the U.S. and
abroad with employees of other agribusiness concerns. The sessions occurred
over several years and in such locations as Tokyo, Hawaii, and Los
Angeles... ." Whitacre also alerted federal agents about "certain meetings,
* Professor of Law, Boston University; B.A., Tufts University; J.D., Columbia University. I
owe special thanks to Yale Kamisar and Karen Tosh for their comments on this Article. Also, I want to
thank members of the Harvard Law School and Vanderbilt Law School faculty workshops for their
suggestions and comments.
1. Archer-Daniels-Midland is often described as "the nation's largest processor of agricultural
commodities, a lean, swift, efficient enterprise. Revenues at this self-described 'supermarket to the
world' have increased from $7.9 billion to $11.4 billion in the past five years as the company has
expanded into new products and new regions." Ronald Henkoff, So Who Is This Mark Whitacre, and
Why Is He Saying These Things About ADM?, FORTUNE, Sept. 4, 1995, at 64, 66.
2. Id. at 66-68.
3. Mark Whitacre, My Life as a Corporate Mole for the FBI, FORTUNE, Sept. 4, 1995, at 52, 60
(as told to Ronald Henkoff).
4. Scott Kilman et al., An Executive Becomes Informant for the FBI, Stunning Giant ADM,
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which helped the government make arrangements to monitor conversations
dealing with the pricing of some products made by Archer-Daniels."'
Whitacre's double identity was exposed when several FBI agents, "armed
with subpoenas" and search warrants, appeared at the homes and offices of
Archer-Daniels executives.' Federal agents played for the curious company
executives some of the tapes that Whitacre had recorded.7
While federal investigators are doubtlessly pleased with the assistance that
Whitacre provided, some citizens of Decatur have taken a less benign view of
his conduct. The Reverend Randy DeJaynes, pastor of Christ Lutheran
Church, explained the reactions of people in his congregation this way:
The biggest feeling here right now is a sense of being violated. It's
as though I became a good friend of your family, came over to your
house all the time, then started rifling through your drawers.... It's
not an intruder, though. It's someone who's trusted-by a company
and by an entire community.'
One member of Reverend DeJaynes's church, frightened by the notion of a
federal spy in the community, condemned the federal government for
fostering such activities: "They're about as underhanded as anybody."9 It
seems that many in Decatur "would rather judge Mr. Whitacre a rat than
contemplate that the company might be a price-fixer."'"
This adverse reaction to the FBI's use of an informant to gather evidence
of possible criminal activity by Archer-Daniels and other agribusinesses is
both surprising and understandable. On the one hand, it is startling that law-
abiding people would criticize the government for investigating allegations
that multi-national corporations were colluding to fix prices on products that
serve as staples for much of the world's diet. Few people would want the
government to ignore such allegations. Moreover, without the assistance of
Whitacre and his agreement to become an informant, investigators would
have encountered numerous obstacles to obtaining the information that would
shed light on whether criminal conduct had actually occurred. In fact, some
information might never have been available but for Whitacre's secret
WALL ST. J., July 10, 1995, atAl.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Carl Quintanilla & Anna D. Wilde, You Dirty Rat, Says Decatur, 111., of Mole at Archer-
Daniels, WALL ST. 3., July 13, 1995, at Al.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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surveillance."
On the other hand, some Americans treasure their freedom and resist
unsolicited government intrusion into their lives. Security and privacy
interests are jeopardized when individuals learn that the government has
recruited and planted informants into their lives to gather information. When
we discover that the colleague, the neighbor, or the business partner is not
what he appears to be, but instead is a covert police agent, our distrust of
government is exacerbated. While many might concede that informants and
spies are essential for effective law enforcement, few cherish the thought that
a co-worker or girlfriend may actually be a police spy. In other words, covert
operations are fine, but "not in my backyard" is a common view. 2
When these strong and sometimes conflicting attitudes toward covert
surveillance by government informants are combined with the well-
documented history of government abuse, both at the federal and state levels,
in spying on its citizens, 3 Americans may be surprised to learn that the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to impose few, if any,
restraints on the government's authority to plant or send covert informants
and spies into our lives. The Court reads the Fourth Amendment's guarantee
against unreasonable governmental searches and seizures 4 to place no
11. See generally GARY S. KATZMANN, INSIDE THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 1-41 (1991) (noting the
importance of informants and undercover operations to the ABSCAM investigation of former Sen.
Harrison Williams). Based on the information provided by Whitacre, several parties sued Archer-
Daniels for price-fixing. On July 19, 1996, a federal judge approved a $45 million settlement claim
against the company and its competitors. Judge Clears Accord on Class-Action Suit Against Archer
Daniels, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1996, at 40. A criminal investigation of Archer-Daniels and its
executives is ongoing.
12. The dubious character of some police informants is a dilemma that often confronts
prosecutors and law enforcement officials. The government, however, is often forced to deal with
individuals it would rather avoid. The due process and ethical concerns inherent in the government's
use of crooked or questionable informants are beyond the scope of this Article. Also, I do not discuss
situations where undercover informants are compelled to commit crimes to sustain their covert status.
Nor does this Article confront the question of whether private persons who act in response to
government encouragement or incentives offered to the public at large are state actors under the Fourth
Amendment. The informants and secret spies involved in all of the cases discussed in this Article are
clearly state actors. But for the secret nature of their activities their conduct would ordinarily be subject
to Fourth Amendment restraints.
13. See generally WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL, THE COINTELPRO PAPERS:
DOCUMENTS FROM THE FBI'S SECRET WARS AGAINST DISSENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1990); FRANK
J. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE: THE AIMS AND METHODS OF AMERICA'S POLITICAL
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM (1980); CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN AND THE SECRETS
(1991); GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA (1988); KENNETH
O'REILLY, "RACIAL MATTERS": THE FBI's SECRET FILE ON BLACK AMERICA, 1960-1972 (1989);
ANTHONY SUMMERS, OFFICIAL AND CONFIDENTIAL: THE SECRET LIFE OF J. EDGAR HOOVER (1993).
14. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
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limitations on the government's power to send informants to infiltrate our
homes, businesses, religious organizations, or social groups. 5
What is the upshot of this constitutional norm? It means secret police
agents may surreptitiously gain entrance to any home or office and gather
information, even though the government lacks reasonable grounds for
believing that a crime has occurred. With no evidence of criminality, the
government can videotape or audiotape actions and conversations that occur
in the presence of covert spies. 6 When the federal government insists that the
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. The authority of the government to infiltrate is not diminished by the fact that the target of its
spying is exercising First Amendment rights of free speech or religious freedom. See United States v.
Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 699-705 (9th Cir. 1989) (permitting undercover agents to infiltrate an
organization engaging in protected First Amendment activities due to the strong governmental interest
in law enforcement). For a detailed discussion of the FBI's use of a secret informant and other
intrusive surveillance methods to spy on the innocent political activities of American citizens, see
DIARMUID JEFFREYS, THE BUREAU: INSIDE THE MODERN FBI 238-73 (1995) (detailing the FBI's
investigation of the Committee in Support of the People of El Salvador). See also Dolores A.
Donovan, Informers Revisited: Government Surveillance of Domestic Political Organizations and the
Fourth and First Amendments, 33 BUFF. L. REV. 333 (1984); Michael F. McCarthy, Note, Expanded
Fourth Amendment Coverage: Protection from Government Infiltration of Churches, 3 GEO. IMMIOR.
L.J. 163 (1989).
16. The Supreme Court has not, however, addressed the issue of whether police officials have the
same discretion to "wire" a criminal suspect's hotel room or other private residence as they do to
"wire" a suspect's colleagues or friends.
For example, imagine that federal law enforcement agents know that a drug suspect plans to stay
at a hotel in Puerto Rico. Before his arrival, the agents, without a warrant, place secret listening
devices inside the suspect's hotel room. After the suspect's arrival, the agents record only those
conversations between the suspect and covert informants regarding illegal drug transactions.
Or, imagine that a suspect asks a colleague who is actually a police informant to reserve a motel
room for him. With the informant's knowledge and consent, police then, again without a warrant,
install a hidden listening device in the room. As in the case above, the police only activate the
surveillance equipment when both the suspect and informant are together in the room.
The lower courts are divided over the constitutional validity of these types of police surveillance.
Regarding the second example, a majority of the lower courts have said that the police surveillance
does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Yonn, 702 F.2d 1341, 1346-47
(11th Cir.) (rejecting the defendant's argument that a recording device concealed in his room is
constitutionally distinguishable from a recording device secretly worn on the body of the informant,
because the location of the recording device does not change the conclusion that his conversation with
te informant lacked constitutional protection), cert. denied sub nom., Weeks v. United States, 464
U.S. 917 (1983). Indeed, one court has extended this reasoning to permit warrantless undercover video
recordings as well. See United States v. Laetividal-Gonzalez, 939 F.2d 1455, 1460-61 (11 th Cir. 1991),
cert. deniedsub nom., Ocampo v. United States, 503 U.S. 912 (1992).
Regarding the first example, one federal court has ruled that this form of police surveillance does
violate the Fourth Amendment See United States v. Padilla, 520 F.2d 526, 527-28 (1st Cir. 1975)
(rejecting the government's position that installation of a secret recording device in a hotel is no
different from a device carried on an informant's person and noting that under the government's
[VOL. 74:573
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target of its concern or curiosity may be connected with a foreign power, even
greater intrusion is allowed.17 This situation might trouble individuals who
value their freedom. 8
This Article argues that the Court's current interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, which sanctions the government's authority to insert secret spies
and informants into our lives, is misguided. Part I highlights the historical
background of the Fourth Amendment to show why its procedural safeguards
are relevant when considering whether the government should be free of
constitutional restraint when deploying informants and spies in our homes
and offices. Part II will explain and critique the Court's cases on informants.
Part III contends that the Court's doctrine on informants rests on a
position, "a room--or an entire hotel-could be bugged permanently with impunity and with the hope
that some usable conversations with agents would occur"). For a review of the cases dealing with
consensual video surveillance, see Kirsten M. Schimpff, Consensual Video Surveillance: Has
Someone Told Big Brother That He Can Watch You? (unpublished student manuscript, on file with
author).
17. In United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 321-22 (1972), the Court left open
the question of whether the President has the inherent authority to conduct warrantless wiretaps and
other physical searches in cases involving foreign powers and their agents inside the United States. In
response, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-
511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1829 (1994)). But "[o]nly electronic
surveillance was regulated under the new FISA law; physical searches of property in national security
investigations still [could] be authorized either by the [P]resident or the [A]ttomey [G]eneral, with no
requirement that a court authorize a warrant." JIM MCGEE & BRIAN DUFFY, MAIN JUSTICE: THE MEN
AND WOMEN WHO ENFORCE THE NATION'S CRIMINAL LAWS AND GUARD ITS LIBERTIES 327 (1996);
id. at 321 (describing the Attorney General's authorization of a search by FBI agents of the home of
Aldrich Ames, a spy for the Soviet Union); see also Don Edwards, Reordering the Priorities of the FBI
in Light of the End of the Cold War, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 59, 70 (1991) (pursuant to a Presidential
Executive Order and foreign intelligence guidelines, the federal government conducts "surveillance of
Americans not even suspected of breaking the law"). Another author has commented that:
[u]nlike other [FBI] squads in Dallas, [the foreign intelligence squad is] relatively
unconstrained by rules and regulations in their use of wiretaps. They do not need a criminal
predicate to monitor a telephone, only a "strong" suspicion that the target may be involved in
intelligence gathering. They also, uniquely, have the ability to open a case on American
citizens even if there is no evidence to suggest that they may have been involved in a crime-
a loose connection with a national security investigation is enough. In other words, agents can
eavesdrop on the private conversations of innocent people in the cause of some greater good.
JEFFREYS, supra note 15, at 205. In October 1994, Congress amended the FISA. See Pub. L. No. 103-359,
108 Stat. 3443 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1829). Under the new law, "the President, acting through the
Attorney General, may authorize physical searches without a court order... to acquire foreign intelligence
information for periods of up to one year," provided the Attomey General satisfies specified certification and
minimization requirements. 50 U.S.C. § 1822(aXI) (1994). The new law also allows judges to authorize
physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes. 50 U.S.C. § 1822(b) (1994).
18. One survey found that its respondents viewed certain forms of undercover police spying as
comparable to the intrusion inherent in a police search of a car, yacht, or footlocker. See Christopher
Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth
Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42
DUKE L.J. 727, 738-40 (1993).
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fallacious conception of privacy. As an alternative to the current approach, I
argue that the government's authority to use informants and secret agents can
and should be controlled by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.
Police operations involving the planting of informants in a home or the
recording of private conversations should be subject to the same
constitutional restraints that currently control governmental wiretapping and
bugging. My conclusion that the procedural safeguards of the Warrant Clause
should regulate the use of informants stems from the belief that the central
meaning of the Fourth Amendment is distrust of police power. As the law
exists today, the police can decide for themselves who will be targets of secret
surveillance. Such untrammeled police power is at odds with the values that
inspired the Fourth Amendment.
I. HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The anxiety and distrust that many feel toward government spies parallel
the text and history of the Fourth Amendment. When government informants
are sent to gather information, their surveillance activities are directed toward
the very object that the Amendment seeks to protect-the security and
privacy individuals have "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures."' 9 When the Fourth Amendment was
adopted in 1791, the unreasonable searches and seizures that preoccupied
Americans primarily involved forcible intrusions into homes by officials
under the authority of general warrants and writs of assistance.2" While much
19. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
20. See, e.g., William J. Cuddihy & B. Cannon Hardy, A Man's House Was Not His Castle:
Origins of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 371, 372
(1980). The principles of the Fourth Amendment "arose from the harsh experience of householders
having their doors hammered open by magistrates and writ-bearing agents of the crown. Indeed, the
Fourth Amendment is explainable only by the history and memory of such abuse." Id.
The history of the Fourth Amendment is richly detailed in several sources that have enlightened
me. See William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, 602-1791 (1990)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School); JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1966); NELSON
B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION (1937); JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, BETWEEN 1761 AND
1772, app. I (Russell & Russell 1969) (1865); M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE (1978);
TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1969); Akhil R. Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994); Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974); Gerard V. Bradley, Present at
the Creation? A Critical Guide to Weeks v. United States and Its Progeny, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1031
(1986); O.M. Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, in THE ERA OF THE
[VOL. 74:573
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has been written about the constitutional evil of general warrants and writs of
assistance, the history of the Fourth Amendment transcends a singled-minded
focus on them. As William Cuddihy explains, "The [Framers'] concern with
warrants, in short, embraced a concern with houses, which encapsulated still
deeper concerns. The [A]mendment's opposition to unreasonable intrusion,
by warrant and without warrant, sprang from a popular opposition to the
surveillance and divulgement that intrusion made possible."2
Why is this history relevant to informants and spies today? The history of
the Amendment reflects a rejection of the unchecked and promiscuous
intrusion that general warrants and other colonial laws authorized. Although
early Americans were quite slow to embrace the proposition that general
searches and seizures were illegal on their face, the language and spirit of the
Fourth Amendment ultimately embody this view.' The collective history of
the Amendment also reveals that the primary tools chosen by the Framers to
combat what they considered to be "unreasonable searches and seizures"
were procedural and substantive safeguards, many of which were delineated
in the Warrant Clause.' If the surveillance activities of government
informants constitute unchecked and promiscuous intrusions of our "persons,
houses, papers and effects," then we should consider whether this conduct is
consistent with the central values that have emerged from the historical
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40-75 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1939); Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the
Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather Than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16
CREIGHTON L. REV. 565 (1983); Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History: Searching For History,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 1996) (reviewing Cuddihy, supra); Joseph R. Frese, Writs of
Assistance in the American Colonies 1660-1776 (Nov. 1951) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
University).
The historical discussion in this Article relies heavily on William Cuddihy's unprecedented
scholarship on the history of the Fourth Amendment. See Cuddihy, supra. As Justice O'Connor
recently acknowledged, Cuddihy's scholarship "is one of the most exhaustive analyses of the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment ever undertaken." Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Action, 115 S. Ct.
2386, 2398 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
21. Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1546.
22. See id. at 345.
Colonial Americans agreed with Englishmen that certain types of search and seizure were
unreasonable but not that general warrants and equivalent warrantless procedures were among
those types.
Americans continued to assume the legitimacy of general warrants, searches, and arrests
for at least a hundred and twenty years after Englishmen had started to reject it ....
Only during the three decades that preceded the Fourth Amendment did Americans come
around to the British view that the general warrant was an unreasonable category of search
and seizure.
Id at 345-46 (footnote omitted).
23. See id. at 1554-60.
1996]
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development of the Fourth Amendment.24
British common law rules dominated colonial thought on search and
seizure questions. In the late seventeenth century, however, English law did
not discourage discretionary invasions by governmental officials. 25 Instead, it
generally confined those intrusions Within identified "social and occupational
boundaries."26 Despite the well-worn adage that "a man's home is his castle,"
the homes of eighteenth-century English citizens were increasingly subject to
discretionary searches for a variety of grounds.2 7 Not surprisingly, British
procedures were followed by colonial officials responsible for formulating
search and seizure policies.28 In fact, British officials often dictated what
those policies would be. As a result, "[d]iscretionary searches were as
24. fH]istory discloses that the chief vice the [F]ramers sought to prevent was suspicionless
searches and seizures. The Supreme Court has considered the historical context to be a
primary source for understanding the Amendment. Thus, in interpreting whether a search or
seizure is reasonable, reference should be made to the meaning that the framers gave to the
term.
Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and
Seizures, 25 U. M.M. L. REV. 483,489-90 (1995) (footnote omitted); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, The Scope
of the Fourth Amendment: Privacy and the Police Use of Spies, Secret Agents, and Informers, 1976 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 1193, 1199, 1211 (noting that forcible entries into the home were the "paradigmatic Fourth
Amendment search and seizure," and advocating that definitions of the scope of the Amendment be "rooted
in the paradigm" and "within historicaly meaningful bounds"); James B. White, The Fourth Amendment as
a Way of Talking About People: A Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 Sup. Cr. REv. 165, 191
(acknowledging the difficulties that lawyers have with examining history, yet urging that "some attempt
should be made, for the authority of the Court and of its judgment begins in large measure with the
connections it can draw with its own past"). But cf. Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Princples,
107 HARV. L. REV. 820 (1994) (cautioning against placing too much reliance on the intention ofthe Framers
when constructing Fourth Amendment rules for today's world).
25. See generally LASSON, supra note 20; SMITH, supra note 20.
26. English law aimed less at abolishing discretionary intrusions than at confining them
within certain social and occupational boundaries. Though coated with a veneer of restraints,
the discretionary core of British laws of search remained starkly discernible. The lines along
which relevant legislation was drawn reflected the hierarchical stratification of a "deferential
society." The freedom with which the government might penetrate a subject's dwelling varied
roughly in accord with his location on the social pyramid.
Cuddihy & Hardy, supra note 20, at 380 (footnote omitted).
27. Id. at 382. In the eighteenth century,
the vulnerability of Englishmen's houses to the excise grew enormously. In the seventeenth
century, chiefly the houses of persons vocationally connected with intoxicating beverages
were subject to unwelcome, warrantless inspection by the exciseman. As the eighteenth
century advanced, however, so did the number and range of excised commodities, until such
diverse articles as salt, soap, paper, and glass were included. When an item became taxable
under the excise, the houses of everyone whose occupation was concerned with it became
subject to search.
Id (footnote omitted).
28. Id. at 387.
[VCOL. 74:573
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common in the colonies as in the mother country."29 What is surprising,
however, is the time it took for the colonists to condemn the abuse associated
with general searches. It was not until the 1760s that a concerted and
sustained movement began in the colonies to resist discretionary and
promiscuous searches and seizures.3"
Prior to the 1760s, "most American commentators on search and seizure
approved or ignored general warrants."'" Although early Americans often
objected to particular forms of government intrusion, there was no universal
consensus that general warrants and discretionary searches were per se illegal.
Long after British legal theorists and precedent had repudiated general
warrants and promiscuous searches, much of colonial society continued to
accept the legitimacy of these practices.32 "The general warrant, or something
resembling it, was the usual protocol of search and arrest everywhere in
colonial America, excepting Massachusetts after 1756."'" Particular searches
and seizures did arouse colonial wrath, but such episodes "usually originated
in violent crises that evoked outrage towards an extraordinary political event,
not dispassionate evaluations of the ordinary legal process of search and
seizure, promiscuous or otherwise."34 As William Cuddihy describes it,
"Colonial Americans championed privacy but ignored the general warrants
eroding that privacy."35 Massachusetts Bay Colony was the first colonial
jurisdiction to repudiate the general warrant and "to substitute specific
warrants for general ones as the orthodox method of search."36 But the Bay
Colony's move toward the specific warrant in the mid-1750s did not
29. Id.
30. Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1002-181.
31. Id.at344.
32. Id.at345-46.
As late as 1760,... Americans were still articulating the same austere arguments on
search and seizure that Englishmen had voiced nearly two centuries earlier, about 1580, when
criticism of those processes had commenced. Since the colonists also enacted and used
general warrants, the conclusion that they did not yet endorse the English arguments against
them was inescapable.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also LASSON, supra note 20, at 55-56 (noting that as late as 1756, objection to
general warrants in Massachusetts Bay had not solidified among the citizenry).
33. Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 468.
34. Id. at 360; see George G. Wolkins, Daniel Malcolm and Writs ofAssistance, 58 MASS. HIST.
SoC'Y 5, 5-36 (Oct. 1924-June 1925) (describing Daniel Malcolm's and other Boston residents'
resistance to customs officers' search of Malcolm's cellar).
35. Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 363. "[G]eneral warrants, the method of search and seizure that
the framers of the [Fourth Amendment] regarded as most unreasonable, were as much American as
British. Door-to-door searches and mass arrests characterized legislation in the colonies no less than in
the mother country." Id. at 377.
36. Id. at 377-78.
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immediately trigger similar reactions among her sister colonies. Even after
victory over the British and the prohibition of general warrants in many state
constitutions, discretionary intrusion by government officers remained the
norm on American soil. 7
Search and seizure procedures slowly started to change in the 1780s. The
states began to take seriously their constitutional prohibitions against general
searches. Indeed, during the early part of the decade, "American law carried
development of the right [against unreasonable search and seizure] to new
heights by enacting various concepts of unreasonable search and seizure that
Englishmen had demanded but that English law had ignored. Although
Britons had long advocated the specific warrant, Americans did more to
actualize it in five years, 1782-87, than Britain had in a century.""a
The newly emerging "Americanization" of the right against unreasonable
search and seizure was not confined to rejection of the general warrant.a9
Other types of intrusion were also deemed unreasonable. For example,
nocturnal searches were universally condemned; in the 1780s "American law
rejected night time searches even more than general ones."' Unannounced
entries were also denounced. Although the Supreme Court recently decided
that the common-law "knock-and-announce" rule forms a part of the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment, early Americans long
ago recognized the fundamental nature of the right to notification before
forcible entry is permitted.4'
37. Cuddihy & Hardy, supra note 20, at 398-400.
38. Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1357.
39. Opposition to general searches was not confined to the state level. "In the most widely
publicized protests on the search process prior to the [A]mendment, the Continental Congress, in 1774,
had unconditionally condemned promiscuous, warrantless searches by customs and excise officers."
Id. at 1499-500 (footnote omitted).
40. Id.at1510.
Perhaps the most dramatic divergence of the American law of search from the British
pattern ... was the American rejection of the nocturnal search.... [The Americans turned
[the British rule] into an almost categorical extinction of official entry at night. Although an
occasional wartime measure provided the contrary, the statutes of all the states except
diminutive Delaware generally forbade searches at night on the dawn of the [A]mendment.
Id. at 1346 (footnotes omitted). Although the issue of nocturnal searches arose in Gooding v. United States,
416 U.S. 430 (1974), the Court chose to put off deciding whether such searches are unreasonable for
constitutional purposes. See id at 461-65 (Marshall, I., dissenting). Lower courts, on the other hand, have
allowed nocturnal searches, despite the historical precedent against them. See, e.g., State v. Seyferth, 397
N.W.2d 666, 668 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (adopting the position that nocturnal searches are not
unconstitutional per se).
41. In Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1918 (1995), the Court ruled that the knock-and-
announce rule is part of the reasonableness inquiry of the Fourth Amendment when judging the
validity of a police entry into a private home. For a helpful discussion of the common-law knock-and-
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Another type of intrusion that became illegal in the 1780s was the
multiple-specific warrant. During the Revolutionary War, many states
employed multiple-specific warrants.42 A multiple-specific warrant identified
the target or object of a search or arrest, but allowed many persons or places
to be subjected to governmental intrusion." Coinciding with the move toward
specific warrants, a number of states also limited search warrants to specific
locations." The text of the Fourth Amendment indicates that the Framers
followed the lead of the states on this matter. The Warrant Clause requires
particularity with respect to the "place"--as opposed to "places" or
"locations"--to be searched.45 Accordingly, a warrant could no longer
authorize the search of multiple locations, which had occurred with multiple-
specific warrants.46 This change was no trivial matter. Under the common
law, a multiple-specific warrant was a powerful tool for the government.47 In
the American colonies, for instance, the New Hampshire Council once
authorized search warrants for "all houses, warehouses, and elsewhere in this
Province," and the Pennsylvania Council once required a weapons search of
"every house in Philadelphia."'4
Therefore, when reviewing the history of the Fourth Amendment, it is
imperative to consider its broad background. The general warrant and its
announce rule and what role it should play in judging entries by the police in today's world, see G.
Robert Blakey, The Rule ofAnnouncement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States and Ker v.
California, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 499 (1964); Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139
(1970); Charles P. Garcia, Note, The Knock and Announce Rule: A New Approach to the Destruction-
of-Evidence Exception, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 685 (1993); and Jennifer M. Goddard, Note, The
Destruction of Evidence Exception to the Knock and Announce Rule: A Callfor Protection of Fourth
Amendment Rights, 75 B.U. L. REV. 449 (1995).
42. Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1341-42.
43. Id. ("Several states had used multiple-specific warrants during the revolution to arrest persons
by the dozen and to search houses for contraband.') (footnote omitted).
44. Id. at 1341-44, 1494-98.
45. The Warrant Clause provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing theplace to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
46. Although the Warrant Clause confines warrants to a specific location, its language permits a
warrant to authorize multiple seizures of "persons or things," provided they are particularly described.
See id.
47. mhe multiple house search via a single warrant or similar device was not an infrequent,
extreme response to rare emergencies but England's conventional method of search for most
purposes. Every suspicious residence in a village could be entered and examined not just for
pesky vagrants, religious fanatics, and political conspirators but also for stolen merchandise,
smuggled contraband, illicit gambling establishments, anyone accused of committing any
felony, and even for persons eating meat in their own homes on prohibited days.
Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 168.
48. Id. at 478 nn.44-45.
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close cousin-the writ of assistance-dominated much of the discussion
among our constitutional ancestors concerning what was an unreasonable
search or seizure. The fear and condemnation of broad warrants and writs of
assistance are evidenced by the Framers' specific prohibition of general
warrants in the latter clause of the Fourth Amendment. But the general
warrant was not the only type of intrusion that early Americans considered
"unreasonable:" "Legislation, case law, legal treatises, pamphlets,
newspapers, constitutional debates, and correspondence in America during
the 1780s condemned not only the general warrant but also certain other
methods of search and seizure so consistently that their constitutional
designation as unreasonable would have been almost superfluous." 9
History reveals the flaw in a narrow, textualist approach to the Fourth
Amendment 0 "[T]he original Fourth Amendment was not a single idea but a
cluster of disparate ideas."'" One of the ideas embraced by the Amendment
was a rejection of the discretionary and promiscuous intrusions that had
flourished in England and America until the 1780s. 2 Although it did not
explicitly outlaw all discretionary searches and seizures, the Amendment
initiated and symbolized an ideal that was uniquely American-discretionary
invasions of privacy and personal security, whether by warrant or without,
violated constitutional liberty. Accordingly, when considering whether
intrusion by government informants and undercover spies satisfies
constitutional norms, we should remember that the Fourth Amendment was
49. Id. at ciii.
50. As Justice Brandeis recognized the language of the Amendment, if read narrowly, would not
cover warrantless searches of private letters placed in the mail. Olmstead v. United States, 277 US.
438, 476 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). "No court which looked at the words of the Amendment
rather than its underlying purpose would hold, as this Court did in Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733
(1877), that its protection extended to letters in the mails." Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 476.
51. Cuddihy, supra note 20, at civ.
52. See id. at 1555.
[A]bolition of the general warrant was part of a larger effort to eliminate all general searches
on land. By 1789, general warrants had expanded in meaning to include multiple-specific
warrants and were only the most significant of several unreasonable searches and seizures.
Promiscuous house searches without warrant were also unreasonable; for that matter, so were
nocturnal and "no-knock" searches.
Id.; cf. Clancy, supra note 24, at 528.
The core complaint of the colonists was not that searches and seizures were warranted,
warrantless, or unauthorized actions; it was the general, suspicionless nature of the searches
and seizures.... As they sought to regulate searches and seizures, the framers held certain
principles to be fundamental, of which particularized suspicion was in the first rank.
Clancy, supra note 24, at 528 (footnotes omitted).
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designed to check the discretionary power of government to invade individual
privacy and security.53
II. MODERN INFORMANT CASES
Although the relevance of history in resolving current Fourth Amendment
problems may be debated, no disagreement exists concerning the meaning of
53. Whether by accident or design, the history of the Fourth Amendment and its relevance to
current search and seizure law is again being debated by constitutional scholars. See, e.g., Amar, supra
note 20; Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People Back into the Fourth Amendment, 62 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 359 (1994); Clancy, supra note 24; Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner
Era: Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 596-609 (1996);
Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: "Here I Go Down That
Wrong Road Again," 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1600-16 (1996); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the
Fourth Amendment is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994); Steiker, supra note 24;
William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 399-411
(1995); Cloud, supra note 20; Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy and Targeting in Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 1996).
A full discussion of this debate is beyond the scope of this Article. It is important, however, to
note that the history of the Fourth Amendment answers some questions, but leaves open many more.
As William Cuddihy has noted, the text of the Amendment "mingles ambiguous and precise language,
for it forbids all types of unreasonable searches and seizures but identifies only one unreasonable type
and that one only implicitly." Cuddihy, supra note 20, at ci (footnote omitted). Moreover, the historical
record "did not illuminate all aspects of the Fourth Amendment equally, nor did [it] explain all of its
original meaning. Th[e] [historical] documents, however, did explain a great deal of that meaning and
were indispensable to its understanding." Id. at ciii.
Thus, an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that focuses on the reasonableness clause will be
unenlightened. Instead, we should look to the Amendment's underlying purpose. See Cloud, The
Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era, supra, at 625 ("When the background purposes and
underlying values for a portion of the Constitution can be discerned, these purposes and values should
drive the interpretation of the text."). While the history of the Fourth Amendment reveals many facets,
one central aspect of that history is pervasive: controlling the discretion of government officials to
invade the privacy and security of citizens, whether that discretion be directed toward the homes and
offices of political dissentients, illegal smugglers, or ordinary criminals.
The Fourth Amendment was the product of a historical debate that progressed beyond the events
of colonial America. Even after the American Revolution, and after state constitutions recognized
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, state officials continued to use discretionary and
general intrusions "for such commonplace activities as collecting taxes, protecting wildlife, pursuing
fugitives, and subjugating slaves. In one jurisdiction, Connecticut, general warrants were still used to
recover stolen property." Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 1276 (footnote omitted). "Pennsylvania and
Virginia used general search warrants or executive proclamations worded like them to apprehend
accused murderers, thieves, and counterfeiters." Id. at 1282. Thus, the events prior to the Revolution
tell only part of the story of the Fourth Amendment's development. Many of the promiscuous and
discretionary search and seizure methods employed by government officials between 1776 and 1789
influenced the debate on the Amendment as much as the controversy surrounding the writs of
assistance and the general warrants employed by British officials. In urging the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment, "Americans served notice that they wanted a federal right regarding search and seizure
that transcended the mere denunciation of general warrants that their state constitutions provided," but
failed to enforce. Id. at 1402-03. Controlling the discretionary authority of federal officials was the
central focus of their concerns.
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the Supreme Court's modem informant cases. These rulings place few, if any,
restrictions on the use of secret informants.5 4
Interestingly, government officials have not always held carte blanche to
infiltrate our lives with informants and spies. The current state of the law is a
relatively recent phenomenon. The Warren Court, which political
conservatives blame for "handcuffing" the power of the police to catch
criminals,55 actually solidified the government's power to use informants free
of constitutional restraint.56 Before the Warren Court rulings of the 1960s
authorized the use of secret police spies and informants, there was a time
when the Fourth Amendment had been interpreted to provide greater
protection against government infiltration of homes and offices.
A. Gouled v. United States
Gouled v. United States57 is the Supreme Court's first secret spy case. The
government had suspected that Gouled and another were conspiring to
defraud the United States Arny.'8 A government agent, who was a friend of
Gouled, went to Gouled's office to gather information about the alleged
54. See infra Section II.
55. See LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 224 (1983) (describing presidential
candidate Richard Nixon's recognization of the public's anger toward the Supreme Court: "The public
resentment at the nine men who had changed the relationship between the police and their prey was
real enough, the fear of crime being second only to the fear of blacks.'); FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-
INFLICTED WOUND 14 (1970) ("To its critics, the [Warren Court was] taking the side of the forces of
evil, to the peril of the good people."); Richard Harris, Annals of Legislation: The Turning Point, NEW
YORKER, Dec. 14, 1968, at 68, 80 (noting Sen. John L. McClellan's frequent complaint that "[t]he
reason the police cannot stop crime is the Court decisions").
56. Cf. Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court
(Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT:
THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 62, 63 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983) (noting that both the
Warren Court and the Burger Court "took the position ... that one who speaks to another not only
takes the risk that his listener will later make public what he has heard but also takes the risk that his
listener will electronically record or simultaneously transmit what he is hearing") (footnote omitted),
Ironically, much of the Court's current search and seizure doctrine on informants stems from one
source: Justice William Brennan, one of the most progressive and influential justices of the twentieth
century. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Remembering the "Old World" of Criminal Procedure: A Reply to
Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537, 541 (1990) (noting that Justice Brennan "was widely
regarded as the leading voice of liberalism on the Court and (a view held by many of his critics as well
as his admirers) as one of the most influential and effective Justices in the Court's history').
57. 255 U.S. 298 (1921). For modem students, Gouled is better known as the case that
established the "mere evidence" rule. This rule announced that police seizures of mere evidence were
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 309. This portion of Gouled was overruled by Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306-07 (1967).
58. Gouled, 255 U.S. at 304. The Court does not indicate the basis of the government's
suspicions that Gouled had engaged in criminal conduct.
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conspiracy.59 "[P]retending to make a friendly call," the agent obtained
admission to the office and "in [Gouled's] absence, without warrant of any
character, seized and carried away several documents," one of which was
later introduced at Gouled's prosecution for fraud. o
The government had two responses to Gouled's protest that his Fourth
Amendment rights had been violated. First, the government argued that force
was the touchstone of an unreasonable search or seizure.6 1 Although it
conceded that its agent had taken advantage of his friendship with Gouled to
gain entry to his office, the government insisted that this ploy did no harm to
Fourth Amendment values.62 Because Gouled had unwittingly allowed entry
to his office, the government contended that it could exploit the situation to
secure any evidence available, provided no force or legal compulsion was
directed at Gouled.
63
The government's second argument assumed a search and seizure had
occurred in Gouled's office, but noted that "[e]very search and seizure made
by an officer without a search warrant is not within the condemnation of the
Fourth Amendment."' Gouled had either consented to the agent's entrance
and subsequent seizure, or waived his Fourth Amendment rights by allowing
his friend access to the office. The government reasoned that
[the Fourth Amendment is] not violated if an officer goes to the
accused and asks and is granted permission to enter his house or his
office. Equally [the Amendment is] not violated if the officer,
without express invitation or permission, enters a place of business
which is open to the public. And again, if the personal relations
existing between the officer and the accused are such that the
former is in the habit of visiting the latter at his office or his home,
there is nothing unlawful in his making such a visit, even though he
may not disclose that he is in search of evidence. When an officer
has lawfully entered a house or an office in any of these ways, the
Constitution does not require him to shut his eyes to any evidence
of crime that may be open to his observation."
59. Id. It is not clear from the Court's opinion whether Gouled was aware of the agent's
attachment to the Intelligence Department of the Army.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 299-300.
62. Id. at 300-01.
63. Id. at 299-301.
64. Id. at 301.
65. Id. (emphasis added).
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In two short paragraphs, a unanimous Court dismissed these arguments.
First, Justice Clarke, writing for the Court, broadsided the government's
claim that force or coercion was an essential ingredient of a Fourth
Amendment violation. He explained that because a forcible, warrantless
intrusion into a house or office to search and seize violates the Constitution,
it is impossible to successfully contend that a like search and seizure
would be a reasonable one if only admission were obtained by
stealth instead of by force or coercion. The security and privacy of
the home or office and of the papers of the owner would be as much
invaded and the search and seizure would be as much against his
will in the one case as in the other, and it must therefore be regarded
as equally in violation of his constitutional rights.66
This statement leaves no doubt that a secret, deliberate governmental
intrusion into an individual's home or office offends the Fourth Amendment
as much as a forcible intrusion. On this point, Justice Clarke probably had in
mind the Court's seminal ruling in Boyd v. United States.67 Boyd explained
that the principles embodied in the Fourth Amendment
apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its
employ~s of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security...."
Gouled established that a covert and planned government entry into a home
or office, whether by force or stealth, could not escape Fourth Amendment
scrutiny.
The Court's response to the argument that Gouled had consented to the
government agent's intrusion is cryptic. The Court stated:
[W]hether entrance to the home or office of a person suspected of
crime be obtained by a [government officer] by stealth, or through
social acquaintance, or in the guise of a business call, and whether
the owner be present or not when he enters, any search and seizure
66. id. at 305-06.
67. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Justice Clark did not cite the case, however.
68. Id. at 630.
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subsequently and secretly made in his absence, falls within the
scope of the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment .... 69
Although it offers passing reference to the government's waiver and
consent claims, the Court never takes the position that Gouled consented to
the entry. Instead, the Court seems to focus on the "search and seizure
subsequently and secretly made in [Gouled's] absence."7 If, however,
Gouled's absence is a necessary element of a Fourth Amendment violation,
then the manner of the agent's entry is unimportant. What matters is Gouled's
ignorance of the agent's seizure; if Gouled witnessed the seizure without
protest or knowingly acquiesced in the agent's conduct, then he would have
had a diminished constitutional complaint. But because he was momentarily
absent during the agent's seizure of the incriminating document and did not
learn of the government's possession of it until much later, Gouled was
unable to protect or assert his Fourth Amendment rights when it mattered
most.
The traditional view of Gouled focuses on the secret seizure that occurred
in Gouled's absence.7' Under this view, if a person unwittingly grants access
to private premises or activities and knowingly reveals to another otherwise
protected conduct, no Fourth Amendment intrusion has occurred.72 This
traditional view is misplaced for two reasons. First, as noted, the Court never
endorses the government's submission that Gouled "waived" or "consented"
to the agent's entry by unwittingly granting access to his office. Second, and
equally important, the traditional view of Gouled proves too much.
Let us consider two slightly altered scenarios of the Gouled facts. First,
after gaining entry to Gouled's office by "pretending to make a friendly
call,"73 the informant observes an incriminating document while Gouled is
still in the room, but does not snatch the document while Gouled's back is
69. Gouled, 255 U.S. at 306.
70. Id.
71. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 209-10 (1966) (stating that Gouled rested on the
absence of the target and the secret seizure that occurred during that absence).
72. Professor LaFave has summarized the Court's holdings on this point as follows:
[Wihen an individual gives consent to another to intrude into an area or activity otherwise
protected by the Fourth Amendment, aware that he will thereby reveal to this other person
either criminal conduct or evidence of such conduct, the consent is not vitiated merely
because it would not have been given but for the nondisclosure or affirmative
misrepresentation which made the consenting party unaware of the other person's identity as
a police officer or police agent.
3 WAYNE RL LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzURE § 8.2(m), at 700 (3d ed. 1996) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
73. Gouled, 255 U.S. at 304.
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turned. The informant then reports to his superiors that Gouled possesses the
incriminating document, whereupon the government obtains a search warrant
to seize it.
Under the second scenario, the infonnant is unable to discover the
incriminating document he was sent to find, but while chatting with Gouled
observes contraband liquor in plain view on a shelf high above Gouled's
desk. After reporting his failure to locate the incriminating document to his
superiors, the informant mentions noticing the contraband liquor. A warrant
to search for the illegal alcohol is then obtained. While executing that
warrant agents seize both the liquor and the incriminating document which is
discovered in plain view on the same shelf holding the whiskey bottles.
In both hypotheticals, Gouled is in the room. Nevertheless, the reasoning
of Gouled would not support either intrusion.74 Both hypotheticals involve
covert and deliberate conduct that invaded Gouled's security and privacy and
that constituted a "search and seizure ... as much against his will"75 as the
actual intrusion condemned in Gouled.76 When the hypothetical agent came to
Gouled's office to determine whether incriminating material was present, he
certainly "searched" the office.77 In the second hypothetical, although the
agent failed to locate the incriminating document, he did observe contraband
liquor. Was this not a "search" of the office?7" While the agent in these
hypotheticals did not seize a tangible item, that fact is irrelevant when
determining whether a search has occurred. If a search is still a search even
though nothing of great personal value is exposed,79 deliberate government
74. See Hajdu v. State, 189 So. 2d 230, 231-32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (extending the
applicability of Gouled to a search conducted in the unwitting presence of the defendant), cert. denied,
189 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1967); see also Osmond K. Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Law of Search
and Seizure, 13 MINN. L. REV. 1, 11 n.87 (1928) (stating that Gouled "condemned a taking by stealth
whether in the presence or absence of the owner").
75. Gouled, 255 U.S. at 305-06.
76. As one modem commentator has put it,"[t]he police undercover agent operation, in short, has
precisely the same objective and serves precisely the same function as more traditional overt
investigative methods, most of which are now subject to the limitations imposed by the [F]ourth
[A]mendment." Joseph R. Lundy, Note, Police Undercover Agents: New Threat to First Amendment
Freedoms, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 634, 648 (1969) (footnote omitted).
77. See Fraternal Order of Eagles, No. 778 v. United States, 57 F.2d 93, 94 (3d Cir. 1932)
(stating that the object of the surreptitious police entry, gained by misrepresentation, was to use what
they could'see as the basis of an application for a search wanant); f. Amar, supra note 20, at 768 n.38
("Perhaps merely looking without touching is not a 'seizure,' but it surely should count as a 'search'
for one who believes in plain meaning .... ).
78. Cf..Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (noting in a discussion of the
appropriate scope of the exclusionary rule that "testimony as to matters observed during an unlawful
invasion has been excluded in order to enforce the basic constitutional policies") (emphasis added).
79. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) (stating that "[a] search is a search, even if it
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conduct that discloses the existence of private information or conversation is
certainly no less of a search.
Some might contend that these hypotheticals bear none of the traits
associated with general warrants and writs of assistance and thus should not
trigger Fourth Amendment concerns. Such skepticism ignores Boyd's
admonition that the protection of the Fourth Amendment is not confined to
traditional ways of thinking:
Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the
aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure, ... it contains
their substance and essence, and effects their substantial purpose. It
may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get
their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.80
Was Gouled responsible for the intrusion? Had he "waived" his Fourth
Amendment rights? After all, if Gouled had not permitted his friend access to
the office, no search or seizure would have occurred, either in the above
hypothetical cases or in Gouled itself. As the government argued, when one
of its officers obtains access to a private enclave through disguise or trickery,
the officer should not be required "to shut his eyes to any evidence of crime
that may be open to his observation."'"
Closer analysis suggests that this tempting stance is insufficient to justify
infringing Fourth Amendment liberties. Admittedly, the Constitution does not
require that police spies ignore evidence of a crime. However, the key
question in Gouled, as in many search and seizure contexts, is how a
government officer gained access to the observed criminal evidence.82 In
Gouled, entry was gained by deliberate deceit, which provided the
opportunity to search and seize. The Gouled Court left no doubt that a
stealthy and deceptive entry infringes constitutional values as much as a
happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable").
80. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
81. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 301 (1921).
82. Cf. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 833 n.27 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The element of access, rather than information, is central to virtually the whole of our
jurisprudence under the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.... Thus, suppression is
the consequence not of a lack of information, but of the fact that the authorities' access to the
evidence in question was not properly authorized and hence was unconstitutional.
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forcible one. 3
The constitutional evil inherent in a covert entry is not diminished by the
fact that someone like Gouled unwittingly allows access to his or her privacy.
Granted, the Constitution does not protect against stupidity, or even against a
private friend who later reveals embarrassing or incriminating information to
the authorities. However, the Fourth Amendment does protect against
unfettered, deliberate efforts by government officials to obtain information
from one's home or office. 4 When Gouled opened his office to his friend, he
had no knowledge of, and did not consent to, the planned governmental
intrusion that occurred.8"
Thus, the traditional, narrow view of Gouled was not predetermined.
There is a better way to read that case: when government agents deliberately
seek access to private premises or private conversations by "stealth, or
through social acquaintance, or in the guise of a business call"86 without
complying with the safeguards of the Fourth Amendment, the subsequent
search and seizure is constitutionally infinn. Put another way, fictive notions
of consent or waiver cannot undercut the basic tenet that planned, covert
intrusions of a protected area or activity violate the Fourth Amendment, just
83. See Gouled, 255 U.S. at 305.
84. This was the view adopted by some lower courts before the Supreme Court decided its
modem informant cases, which took a very different and narrow view of Gouled. See United States v.
Reckis, 119 F. Supp. 687, 690 & n.1 (D. Mass. 1954) (interpreting Gouled to stand for the proposition
that incriminating statements and evidence obtained by means of fraud violate the Fourth
Amendment); People v. Dent, 19 N.E.2d 1020, 1021-22 (I11. 1939) (relying upon Gouled to hold that
permission to enter a home, given in ignorance of the identity and purpose of those seeking admission,
renders a subsequent entry and search invalid); cf. Amsterdam, supra note 20, at 407 ("[I]t is not
betrayal against which the [Flourth [A]mendment protects us: it is the privacy of a free people living
free lives.").
85. See, e.g., People v. Reeves, 391 P.2d 393, 396 (Cal. 1964) (relying upon Gouled for the
proposition that the Fourth Amendment proscribes stealthy and fraudulent entry into the home); People
v. Roberts, 303 P.2d 721, 723 (Cal. 1956). According to one commentator,
[u]ndercover agents often violate [the] sanctity [of a home or office] when they gain access to
a person's home or workplace without a warrant. They may be invited in, but only because of
deception-under the guise of friendship, a business partnership, or through the access
granted a phony housing inspector or meter reader. It is sophistry to argue that that such
searches are voluntary. A person may give consent to a meter reader, but only to have the
meter read, not to have the house searched. Consent is highly circumscribed; if the target was
not duped, access would be denied. When the public-private boundary can be transgressed at
will, whether through deception or coercion and force, liberty is impossible. Liberty exists
partly because there are private and personal spaces that are beyond official reach.
MARX, supra note 13, at 99-100; see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Note, The Progress of the Lmv, 1919-1922,
Evidence III, 35 HARV. L. REV. 673, 700 (1922) (explaining the holding of Gouled as turning upon the
violation of the security and privacy of the home).
86. Gouled, 255 U.S. at 306.
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as open and forcible invasions do. 7
One might find this interpretation of Gouled troubling because it imparts
both to the Constitution and the Court an intent to bar all governmental efforts
to use secret methods and personnel for law enforcement purposes. While
such a broad view of the Fourth Amendment is not without merit, the Court
has rarely interpreted the Amendment as an "all-or-nothing' proposition.
Many years before Gouled, in Exparte Jackson,8 the Court explained that
federal officials did not have discretion to invade the secrecy of letters and
packages placed in the mail. 9 Ex parte Jackson, however, did not completely
bar opening suspicious mail. The Court simply reminded federal officers that
mail "can only be opened and examined under [a judicial] warrant, issued
upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be seized,
as is required when papers are subjected to search in one's own household."'
The same can be said about Gouled. Although the issue was not
specifically discussed because the informant went to Gouled's office without
judicial authorization, the Court did not suggest that covert efforts to secure
evidence are impermissible.9" Indeed, in describing the informant's conduct in
Gouled's office, the Court pointedly noted that the informant had acted
"without warrant of any character."92 If the Court believed that no warrant
could have properly been issued to secure the targeted evidence, there would
have been no need to reference the lack of a warrant.
87. For the proposition that Gouled invalidates fraudulently procured consent to search, see
United States v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408, 415 (2d Cir.) (stating that the rule of Gouled condemns
fraudulently obtained consent to search), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 918 (1959); Dent, 19 N.E.2d at 1021-
22 (holding that after Gouled, valid consent to enter must be predicated upon knowledge of the identity
of the agent as a police officer); Commonwealth v. Wright, 190 A.2d 709, 711 (Pa. 1963) (relying
upon Gouled to hold that "consent [to search] may not be gained through stealth, deceit or
misrepresentation").
88. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
89. Id. at 733.
90. Id.
91. In dicta, the Gouled Court stated "[W]e cannot doubt that contracts may be so used as
instruments or agencies for perpetrating frauds upon the Government as to give the public an interest
in them which would justify the search for and seizure of them, under a properly issued search warrant,
for the purpose of preventing further frauds." Gouled, 255 U.S. at 309.
92. Id. at 304. Of course, it must be acknowledged that Gouled also ruled "mere evidence" was
outside of the scope of even validly issued warrants. Id. at 309. As described in Gouled, this
prohibition on the permissible objects of search wanants "does indeed loom as an awesome barrier,"
Yale Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor's View, 44 MINN. L. REV.
891, 915 (1960), to regulating the use of informants under the Warrant Clause. But as Professor
Kamisar has explained, even during its heyday, the "mere evidence" rule was "cluttered with
inconsistencies and uncertainties as to permit much freedom of movement" for judges that wanted to
avoid its formulaic restrictions and to admit evidence helpful to the prosecution. Id. at 917 (footnote
omitted).
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In sum, the traditional explanation-Gouled's absence from the room,
when the incriminating documents were seized, constituted the key element
of the constitutional harm-provides only a partial analysis of the Court's
concern with secret government informants who invade an individual's
privacy and security.93 This orthodox view discounts the Gouled ruling that
stealthy, warrantless governmental intrusions trigger Fourth Amendment
scrutiny. Furthermore, when one realizes that intangible effects (e.g.,
conversations and observations),94 as well as tangible effects, are subject to
search and seizure by government informants, the current and narrow view of
Gouled fails to protect places and activities ordinarily included under the
umbrella of the Fourth Amendment.
When thoughtfully examined, Gouled establishes the principle that the
police cannot decide for themselves when to send a secret informant into a
person's home or office to gather otherwise protected information. Gouled's
absence from the room was certainly a "circumstance[] of aggravation" '95 that
made it easier for the agent to accomplish his mission, but absence during the
actual seizure of information should not be considered the sine qua non of a
constitutional violation.96
93. Before the modem Court's view of the Fourth Amendment and secret informants was
solidified, some lower courts did not read Gouled as narrowly as it is read today. See Fraternal Order
of Eagles, No. 778 v. United States, 57 F.2d 93, 94 (applying Gouled to a stealthy search conducted in
the defendants' presence); Hadju v. State, 189 So. 2d 230, 231-32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (applying
the holding of Gouled to a search conducted by an agent in the unwitting presence of the defendant),
cert. denied, 196 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1967); Fraenkel, supra note 74, at 11 n.87 (suggesting that the
Fourth Amendment violation did not depend upon Gouled's absence); see also Chafee, supra note 85,
at 700 (explaining the holding of Gouled as turning upon the violation of the security and privacy of
the home).
94. See Fraternal Order of Eagles. No. 778, 57 F.2d at 93-94 (holding that the stealthy
observation of contraband liquor by agents posing as lodge members was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment). In later rulings, the Court definitively ruled that intangible objects are protected under
the Fourth Amendment. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (reaffirming that "the
Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording
of oral statements, overheard without any 'technical trespass under ... local property law' (omission in
original) (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))).
95. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
96. Although Justice Black was no fan of the Fourth Amendment, see generally ROGER K.
NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 371-72 (1994); Jacob W. Landynski, In Search of Justice
Black's Fourth Amendment, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (1976), he captured the essence of Gouled's
reasoning in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where he argued in dissent that the Fourth
Amendment protects more than privacy, id. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting). "The average man would
very likely not have his feelings soothed any more by having his property seized openly than by
having it seized privately and by stealth." Id.
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B. Why Has Gouled Been Accorded a Narrow Interpretation?
As the above discussion highlights, Gouled can be read in alternative
ways. Under one view, Gouled stands for the narrow proposition that a
clandestine search or seizure in the absence of the target violates the Fourth
Amendment. Alternatively, Gouled establishes the common-sense rule that
secret and deliberate governmental intrusions of private premises or private
activities will not escape Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Under this alternative
vision, Gouled does not forbid the use of informants and secret spies; it
merely holds that these forms of surveillance are subject to the same
procedural safeguards of the Warrant Clause as more overt and more violent
forms of search and seizure. In light of the history of the Amendment,97
particularly the concern with searches of private homes," this interpretation
of Gouled is a logical and moderate interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
Despite its modest conclusions, this alternative view of Gouled has never
been accepted by a succeeding majority on the Court. The Court's subsequent
cases have never even fully discussed these competing visions of Gouled.
However, if one keeps in mind that the Fourth Amendment is essentially
about prohibiting promiscuous and discretionary intrusions by government
officials into a person's home or office," then a core principle emerges from
Gouled. That principle states that police officials are not free to decide for
themselves when an individual's private space and conversations will be
invaded by secret governmental surveillance. Rather than grapple with this
cardinal point, the modem Court has undermined the crux of Gouled with
slogans, unproven assumptions about how individuals organize their private
lives, and unsubstantiated fears that taking Gouled seriously would mean the
end of undercover police operations.
The Court first questioned Gouled in Olmstead v. United States.tu0
Olmstead ruled that governmental wiretapping of telephone conversations fell
outside the protection of the Fourth Amendment.0 ' The Court based its
97. See discussion supra Part I.
98. As former Senator Sam Ervin, Jr. has aptly described, an individual's home has always
occupied a special place in our constitutional history. "The oldest and deepest hunger of the human
heart is for a place where one may dwell in peace and security and keep inviolate from public scrutiny
one's innermost aspirations and thoughts, one's most intimate associations and communications, and
one's most private activities." Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule: An Essential Ingredient of the
Fourth Amendment, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 283.
99. See discussion supra Part I.
100. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
101. Id.at465-66.
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conclusion on two findings and one supposition. First, the Court found that
words spoken into a telephone were not tangible things and thus could not be
subjected to a search or seizure."2 Second, the Court found that because
wiretapping could be accomplished without a trespass, there was no physical
invasion of property to justify invoking the Fourth Amendment.' °3 Finally,
the Court assumed that one who uses the telephone "intends to project his
voice to those quite outside."'"
In distinguishing Gouled, the Olmstead Court gratuitously and without
explanation announced that Gouled had "carried the inhibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures to the extreme limit."' ' The Court then
distinguished wiretapping from the precise facts of Gouled by noting that in
Gouled "[t]here was actual entrance into the private quarters of [the]
defendant and the taking away of something tangible. Here we have
testimony only of voluntary conversations secretly overheard."'0 6
Olmstead's holding on wiretapping was immediately challenged both on
and off the Court, and has been properly rejected by the modem Court. 7
Putting aside Olmstead's faulty analysis on wiretapping, what support is there
for the dictum that Gouled "carried the inhibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures to the extreme limit"?0 8 Is it extremist to believe that
secret and deliberate intrusions by governmental agents infringe the privacy
and security of homes and offices, just as overt breakings and enterings by
uniformed police officers do? Does it stretch the protections of the Fourth
Amendment to the breaking point to suggest that the FBI or state police
officials should not be allowed to decide for themselves when our homes,
offices, or social groups will be subjected to government infiltration by spies
and informants? Is it asking too much to require the police to explain to a
neutral judicial officer the basis for their belief that a particular individual or
organization is engaged in criminal activity prior to any intrusion into one's
privacy? The answer to all these questions is "no." The police should have to
demonstrate good cause for deliberate intrusions into the privacy of citizens
when using informants, just as they must do when they conduct conventional
searches and seizures.
102. Id. at 464.
103. Id. at 464-66.
104. Id. at 466.
105. Id. at463.
106. ld. at464.
107. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967); infra notes 216-26 and
accompanying text.
108. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at463.
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Perhaps the Olmstead Court viewed Gouled as reflecting the "extreme
limit'' I° of Fourth Amendment protection because, properly understood,
Gouled's reasoning would not only apply to informants who swipe
incriminating documents while the target's back is turned, but also to
informants who read or examine incriminating documents in full view of the
target. Another possibility is that the Court foresaw that Gouled's inclusion of
secret governmental intrusions under the protective umbrella of the Fourth
Amendment would mean that informants who monitor and report
conversations with government targets could no longer escape constitutional
scrutiny.
Olmstead resolved a controversial constitutional issue"' with simplistic
analysis. Considering only the literal text of the Amendment as its words
were understood by the Framers, Olmstead sanctioned governmental
wiretapping without legal restraint."' Although the Olmstead Court insisted
that its reasoning was consistent with previous cases,"' in reality, the decision
"represented a clear break from the Court's prior precedents.""'
After Olmstead gave police officials a license to wiretap at will, strong
notes of disapproval arose from Congress and the general public."4 Still,
when confronted with claims that government spies and informants have
violated the Fourth Amendment rights of their targets, subsequent majorities
of the modem Court have performed no better than the Olmstead majority.
Indeed, when considering whether deliberate police surveillance jeopardizes
Fourth Amendment values, the modem Court has not carefully examined
109. Id.
110. The issue of wiretapping has always deeply divided the Court and the nation. "Even the
solicitor general in his Olmstead brief claimed that the government was 'not defending wiretapping as
a method proper generally to be used for detection of crime."' ALEXANDER CHARNS, CLOAK AND
GAVEL: FBI WIRETAPS, BUGS, INFORMERS, AND THE SUPREME COURT 19 (1992) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Brief for the United States at 41, Olmstead). In Olmstead, the Court split five to four---"the
first such close division in any search case." LANDYNSKI, supra note 20, at 201. See generally Alan F.
Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 165
(1952).
111. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 (noting that the wiretapping did not amount to a Fourth
Amendment violation).
112. Id.at458-64.
113. Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of the Fourth Amendment
in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647, 658 (1988) (footnote
omitted).
114. See Michael Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title III: Rewriting the Law of Electronic
Surveillance, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 11 & n.48 (1983) (citing proposed bills to overrule
Olmstead); Westin, supra note 110, at 173 & nA3 (same). Eventually, of course, the modem Court
rejected the constitutional premises and conclusions of Olmstead. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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Gouled's reasoning.' In the end, the Court has never asked the obvious
question that Justice Brandeis posed in his famous and elegant dissent in
Olmstead: "Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such
invasions of individual security?""
' 16
C. Informant Cases Since Gouled
On Lee v. United States 17 was the next case after Gouled to raise the
issue of informant spying. Chin Poy, a friend and former employee of
defendant On Lee, went to On Lee's laundry shop."8 Unknown to On Lee,
Chin Poy was a government informant "wired for sound, with a small
microphone in his inside overcoat pocket and a small antenna running along
his an."119 Also unknown to On Lee, an officer from the federal Narcotics
Bureau was stationed outside the laundry shop and equipped to listen to the
conversation between On Lee and Chin Poy 20 Several days later, another
conversation between On Lee and Chin Poy on the street was monitored by
the same officer.'' During both conversations, On Lee made incriminating
statements.'22 At trial, the officer was allowed to testify about On Lee's
incriminating statements.12
The On Lee Court saw no Fourth Amendment violation in these facts.
There was no constitutional trespass because "Chin Poy entered a place of
business with the consent, if not by the implied invitation, of the
[defendant].', 124 The companion claim that the officer had committed a
trespass because the electronic equipment allowed him to secretly overhear
what transpired inside was, in the eyes of the Court, "frivolous."'" Only a
"physical entry," such as one associated with force, submission to legal
coercion, or without any sign of consent, would trigger constitutional
protection against this form of stealthy government surveillance.'26
The Court also dismissed the contention that it should treat informant
115. See supra Part ll.B.
116. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
117. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
118. Id. at 749.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 749-50.
124. Id. at751-52.
125. Id. at 752.
126. Id. at 752-53.
[VOL. 74:573
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol74/iss3/5
INFORMANTS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
surveillance on a equal footing with police wiretapping. To the Court, the use
of a radio wire suggested only "the most attenuated analogy to
wiretapping."' 27 On Lee was talking confidentially with a trusted friend, and
he was overheard. 28 The Court stated:
It would be a dubious service to the genuine liberties protected by
the Fourth Amendment to make them bedfellows with spurious
liberties improvised by farfetched analogies which would liken
eavesdropping on a conversation, with the connivance of one of the
parties, to an unreasonable search or seizure. We find no violation
of the Fourth Amendment here. 2 9
On Lee's discussion of the Fourth Amendment typifies the modem
Court's neglect of Gouled and illustrates how loose language can generate a
misunderstanding of what the Fourth Amendment protects. On Lee was
authored by Justice Robert Jackson, a hard-nosed former prosecutor who
sometimes took a narrow view of the constitutional rights guaranteed criminal
suspects.' Jackson's hard-line views are evident in On Lee. He found that it
was "frivolous" to argue that the recording and monitoring of Chin Poy and
On Lee's conversation merited constitutional review.' Only a "physical
entry," Jackson explains, triggers constitutional concern.' Placing concealed
electronic equipment on an informant to gain government access that
otherwise would not have been granted raised no constitutional concern.'
In later years, the Court would reject the notion that Fourth Amendment
127. Id. at 753.
128. Id. at 753-54.
129. Id. at 754.
130. Although Justice Jackson's dissent in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-88
(1949), is often cited by judges and lawyers urging an expansive interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, infra note 329, Justice Jackson is better known among experts in criminal procedure for
his opinions in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 129-38 (1954) (principal opinion upholding
conviction despite several illegal police entries into the defendant's home to install a secret
microphone, and then moving that microphone to his bedroom to facilitate the recording of
conversations); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 156-174 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with the Court's reversal of a conviction resulting from a confession that had been
obtained after 36 hours of continuous interrogation by the police); and Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49,
57-62 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the reversal of a
conviction obtained after a suspect had been held for five days in solitary confinement, subjected to
constant interrogation without being advised of his constitutional rights, and denied an opportunity to
sleep, eat decent food, or consult with counsel).
131. See On Lee, 343 U.S. at 752.
132. Id. at 752-53.
133. Seeid.at751.
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liberties turn on the arcane and confusing concepts of property or tort law." 4
As stated in Katz v. United States, 35 "[T]he Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places."'136 However, the Court's de-coupling of search and
seizure doctrine from property and tort law concepts in the 1950s and
1960s137 does not adequately explain why On Lee's claim was "frivolous"
when three decades earlier the Court had debunked the notion that force or
violence is needed to trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny.13 1 On Lee's claim
of a secret and deliberate government scheme to invade the privacy of his
business and to record his conversations was hardly a "frivolous" argument in
light of Gouled.
The On Lee Court also focused on whether "eavesdropping on a
conversation, with the connivance of one of the parties," deserved protection
under the Fourth Amendment. 139  The majority emphasized that the
government's conduct was no more intrusive than common law
eavesdropping, and the use of technology to enhance human perception was
not unreasonable. 4 But what occurred in On Lee could hardly be
characterized as eavesdropping. 4' On the contrary, the government's
134. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) ("[A]rcane distinctions developed in property
and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like, ought not to control." (citing Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960))); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) ("The
premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been
discredited."); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 617 (1961); Jones 362 U.S. at 266; United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52-54 (1951); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948); cf
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 232 (1986) ("State tort law governing unfair
competition does not define the limits of the Fourth Amendment.").
135. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
136. Id. at 351.
137. See supra note 134.
138. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
139. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952).
140. Id. at 753-54.
141. Although beyond the scope of this Article, the Court's casual suggestion that governmental
eavesdropping raises no Fourth Amendment concerns is not obvious. As one commentator has noted:
When a policeman overhears a private conversation, the conversants are surely denied the
privacy they desired whether or not he uses electronic devices. Nevertheless, it is generally
accepted that the naked ear eavesdropper is beyond legal proscription, while the electronically
equipped snoop is the object of considerable limitation. It is not clear that this distinction is
justifiable from a theoretical point of view.
Michael S. Josephson, Book Review, 15 UCLA L. REV. 1586, 1593-94 (1968).
Some may see no threat to Fourth Amendment values when a police officer overhears a private
conversation between two persons. For example, imagine that an off-duty police officer overhears the
incriminating conversation of Joe and Moe while sitting in the bleacher seats of Yankee Stadium.
Surely, he is free to report his discovery without fear of violating the Constitution. If this is true, why
should the constitutional result be different when the officer is deliberately positioned to hear the
conversation? The difference turns on the fact that in the latter case the government has planned to
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placement of Chin Poy inside On Lee's laundry shop with a microphone to
monitor subsequent conversations was a calculated police operation, without
judicial supervision, to seize words that On Lee assumed would not be
broadcast.
The fact that Chin Poy had been wired for sound is not determinative of
the constitutional issue. Certainly, the use of electronic equipment to transmit
Chin Poy and On Lee's conversations to a third party was a "circumstance[]
of aggravation."' 42 But the crux of the constitutional harm in On Lee occurred
when Chin Poy, "pretending to make a friendly call,"' 43 and "without warrant
of any character,"' 44 was sent into On Lee's laundry to capture private
conversations. On Lee no more consented to this secret and planned seizure
of his words than did Gouled when he invited his friend into his office. Like
the intrusion in Gouled, which resulted in the secret seizure of a document
that Gouled believed would remain private, the intrusion in On Lee, which
facilitated the seizure of words that On Lee believed would remain private,
invaded privacy. Thus, both intrusions should be controlled by the Warrant
Clause.
141
On Lee also emphasized that the government should not be prevented
from using modem technology to enhance human perceptions.44 The use of
such technology, so the argument goes, does not transform a government
intrusion into a forbidden search or seizure, even if the target is unaware of
the government's surveillance. 147 To be sure, the Court has not erected
constitutional barriers for police officials who testify about what they see or
intrude upon the privacy of Joe and Moe's conversation. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 471 n.27 (1971) (plurality opinion) ("In assessing these claims, it is well to keep in mind that we
deal here with a planned warrantless seizure .... [It is] beyond doubt that the mere fact that the police
have legitimately obtained a plain [hearing] ... of incriminating evidence is not enough to justify a
warrantless seizure."). As both history and current doctrine indicate, the Fourth Amendment was
designed to control police discretion to search and seize, not simple happenstance. See Broyer v.
County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (Fourth Amendment addresses intentional misuses of
government power.); cf. Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1335 (1994)
("The Fourth Amendment ... [is] not directed at some hypothetical government agent and what he
might or would have done. [It] exist[s] to regulate the actual conduct of actual government agents in
actual cases.").
142. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
143. Gouledv. United States, 255 U.S. 298,304 (1921).
144. Id
145. Cf Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 449 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("If a person
commits his secret thoughts to paper, that is no license for the police to seize the paper, if a person
communicates his secret thoughts verbally to another, that is no license for the police to record the
words.").
146. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747,753-54 (1952).
147. See id.
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hear. 48 The question in On Lee, however, was not whether government
officials would be barred from relying upon modem technology, or even
whether an officer must "shut his eyes to any evidence of crime that may be
open to his observation"' 149 due to the use of such technology. Rather, as in
Gouled, the question involved how a government agent gains access to
evidence that may be open to his perception because of advanced
technology. 5 ' As in Gouled, the government gained access to On Lee's
private office and conversations by deliberate deceit and exploitation of the
target's ignorance.' Gouled found that this form of entry and seizure offends
constitutional values as much as a forcible intrusion does. This same
reasoning also applies in On Lee.
Finally, On Lee declared that Fourth Amendment freedoms should not be
equated "with spurious liberties improvised by farfetched analogies which
would liken eavesdropping on a conversation, with the connivance of one of
the parties, to an unreasonable search or seizure."' 52 This passage is
bewildering. What are the "spurious liberties" the Court has in mind?
Was On Lee asserting a "spurious liberty" when he claimed that his
private conversations were deserving of Fourth Amendment protection? Soon
after On Lee, a majority of the Court would take the view that private
conversations are protected by the Fourth Amendment.'53 Was On Lee
asserting a "spurious liberty" when he protested against a secret and
deliberate governmental scheme to seize his private conversations? The
holding of Gouled, when combined with the updated view that private
conversations are "effects" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
strongly suggests otherwise."
To continue, was On Lee asserting a "spurious liberty" when he claimed
he had not consented to the government's conduct? Again, the reasoning of
148. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928) (A liberal construction of the Fourth
Amendment does not justify applying it so "as to forbid hearing or sight."); United States v. Lee, 274
U.S. 559, 563 (1927); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1924).
149. Gouled, 255 U.S. at 301 (argument of the United States government).
150. As Professor Kamisar has noted in a related context, in determining whether evidence has
been obtained in a constitutional manner, we should not "dwell on the nature of the evidence in the
abstract or focus exclusively on the last step of a multistep course of action by the police. We should
consider, instead, the entire course of police conduct from beginning to end." Yale Kamisar, On the
"Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV.
929, 960 (1995).
151. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747,749-50 (1952).
152. Id. at 754.
153. See Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (per curiam); Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505 (1961).
154. See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
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Gouled indicates otherwise. Finally, was On Lee asserting a "spurious
liberty" when he urged that deliberate government efforts to invade his
privacy and seize his words ought not be left to the discretion of police
officials? Was he not invoking the core of the Fourth Amendment-the
distrust of police power, the need to check the discretion of government
officials when their authority jeopardizes the security and privacy of
individuals, and the desire to protect the sanctity of private areas and activities
from unchecked government invasion?
Considered separately, the factors listed by the On Lee Court' 5 did not
justify a secret and planned invasion of On Lee's laundry shop and the seizure
of his words any more than did the similar factors asserted three decades
earlier in Gouled, when the government tried unsuccessfully to justify a
comparable intrusion.'56 At bottom, On Lee upheld the challenged intrusion
because it appeared to be no more intrusive than official eavesdropping "with
the connivance of one of the parties," '157 but this fact cannot justify the result
in On Lee. Although the intrusion in On Lee proceeded "with the connivance
of one of the parties," the same can be said about the facts in Gouled.'5
Therefore, the Court must explain why the intrusion in On Lee is permissible,
while the similar intrusion in Gouled is not' 5 9
Three Warren Court cases-Lopez v. United States,"6 Lewis v. United
States,'61 and Hoffa v. United States'62-were the next rulings that advanced
the "demise' of Gouled. Each shows how far the Court has moved from the
logic and constitutional understandings established in Gouled.
In Lopez the defendant appealed his conviction for the attempted bribery
of an Internal Revenue agent. 63 The agent had visited Lopez's business to
inquire about the payment of excise taxes."6 During the visit, Lopez had
offered the agent a bribe. 165 Pretending to go along with the bribery scheme,
the agent returned to Lopez's office several days later equipped with a pocket
155. See On Lee, 343 U.S. at 753-55.
156. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298,301-02 (1921).
157. On Lee, 343 U.S. at 754.
158. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (discussing how informant in Gouled gained
entry to Gouled's office "(p]retending to make a friendly call upon the defendant").
159. The Court has yet to offer such an explanation.
160. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
161. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
162. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
163. Lopez, 373 U.S. at 427.
164. Id. at 429.
165. Id. at 430.
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recorder.' 66 During this second visit, Lopez made additional incriminating
statements. 67 At Lopez's trial, the agent testified about the conversation that
Lopez had initiated, and a tape recording of the conversation was played to
corroborate the agent's testimony. 16 On appeal, Lopez argued that the agent's
testimony, as well as the tape recording, were inadmissible because the
agent's visit to his office violated the Fourth Amendment.
69
Four Justices in Lopez declared that both Olmstead and On Lee were
wrongly decided. 70 Nevertheless, a majority of the Justices upheld the
conviction. Speaking for the majority, Justice Harlan saw no unlawful
invasion of Lopez's office because the agent had had Lopez's "consent, and
while there [the agent] did not violate the privacy of the office by seizing
something surreptitiously without Lopez' knowledge."''
The only evidence obtained [by the agent] consisted of statements
made by Lopez to [the agent], statements which Lopez knew full
well could be used against him by [the agent] if he wished. We
decline to hold that whenever an offer of a bribe is made in private,
and the offeree does not intend to accept, that offer is a
constitutionally protected communication.1
72
For Justice Harlan, Lopez's consent and knowledge were enough to
distinguish Gouled. Should they have been enough? True, the revenue agent
had been in the office with Lopez's permission, but the same can be said
about the informant in Gouled. Of course, the Gouled Court never accepted
the claim that Gouled had "consented" to the government entry of his
office. 73 Unlike Gouled, however, Lopez had known that he was confronting
a federal law enforcement officer. In addition, Lopez had initiated the
conversation with the federal agent and had encouraged that agent to return to
166. Id.
167. Id. at431-32.
168. Id. at427.
169. Id. at437.
170. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Goldberg would overrule On Lee.
Chief Justice Warren argued that Lopez and On Lee were different cases. In On Lee "[tihe use and
purpose of the transmitter.., was not to corroborate the testimony of [the informant], but rather, to
obviate the need to put him on the stand." Id. at 443 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result). For the Chief
Justice, electronic surveillance, when used in the manner at issue in On Lee, raised substantial
questions of due process. Id. at 441. Justice Brennan, speaking for two other Justices, contended that
On Lee and Lopez were indistinguishable. Id. at 446-47, 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
urged that On Lee be reversed on the merits. Id. at 446-53.
171. Id.at438.
172. Id.
173. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298,305-06 (1921).
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his office. 74
In Gouled and the Court's subsequent informant cases, covert agents were
deliberately sent to search and monitor premises or activities otherwise
constitutionally protected, whereas in Lopez an obvious police official
approached Lopez with no intent to search and seize. This distinction is
critical. Lopez's awareness that he was facing a law enforcement official and
his subsequent conduct demonstrated consent to the police entry and
accordingly undermined his Fourth Amendment claim. Instead of
distinguishing Lopez in this manner suggested, the Court divided on whether
the use of a transmitter to record the conversation between Lopez and the
agent was constitutional. The majority saw no constitutional vice because the
transmitter had been "used only to obtain the most reliable evidence possible
of a conversation in which the Government's own agent was a participant and
which that agent was fully entitled to disclose."'75 The Lopez dissenters, on
the other hand, argued that the presence of a recording device was
constitutionally significant because it allowed third parties to monitor private
conversations.'76 When electronic equipment is removed from the
constitutional calculus, however, all of the Justices in Lopez seemed to agree
that the agent's oral testimony was admissible and not the "fruit" of an
unlawful search or seizure.'77 The rationale underlying this agreement,
although not particularly distinct, was most explicitly articulated by Justice
Brennan's dissent.
Justice Brennan appeared to borrow from a theme that first surfaced in
Olmstead. In that case, the Court justified its conclusion that wiretapping was
not a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment by speculating about the
subjective views of the "reasonable" person. "The reasonable view is that one
who installs in his house a telephone instrument with connecting wires
174. See Lopez, 373 U.S. at 429-32.
175. Id. at 439.
176. As Justice Brennan described it:
[Tihe risk which both On Lee and [Lopez] impose is of a different order. It is the risk that
third parties, whether mechanical auditors like the Minifon or human transcribers of
mechanical transmissions as in On Lee-third parties who cannot be shut out of a
conversation as conventional eavesdroppers can be, merely by a lowering of voices, or
withdrawing to a private place-may give independent evidence of any conversation.
Id. at 450 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177. See id. at 438 (holding that the agent could testify as to the statements by which Lopez
offered the agent a bribe); id. at 442 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result) (stating that the recording
of the conversation between Lopez and the agent was a permissible means of corroborating the agent's
testimony); id. at 450 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that Lopez assumed the risk that the agent
would use Lopez's statements against him).
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intends to project his voice to those quite outside, and that the wires beyond
his house and messages while passing over them are not within the protection
of the Fourth Amendment."7  This finding on what the "reasonable" person
intends was not, of course, empirically based. It was merely the Court's
unsupported assumption about how individuals organize their privacy.
In Lopez, Justice Brennan adopted a similar approach in explaining why
ordinary conversations between an individual and a disguised government
informant fall outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment. According to
Brennan, such conversations "do not seriously intrude upon the right of
privacy. The risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an
informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is
probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the kind of risk we
necessarily assume whenever we speak."'179
Justice Brennan's comments were doubly unfortunate. First, his dictum
was an unnecessary detour from the facts in Lopez. The case could have been
decided on straightforward consent grounds in light of Lopez's awareness
that he was confronting a police official.8 Justice Brennan's discussion of
secret police informants and eavesdroppers was unwarranted because such
activity was not even remotely at issue in Lopez.
Second, Justice Brennan's conclusion about the risks we assume by
speaking was no more based on hard facts than was Chief Justice Taft's
conclusion in Olmstead.'' Nor were Justice Brennan's views tied to a
principle embraced by the Fourth Amendment. It was simply his conclusion
about how most folks live their lives.
Three years later, the Court adopted Justice Brennan's risk model in Lewis
v. United States8 2 and Hoffa v. United States. 3 The facts in Lewis were
straightforward: an undercover police officer misrepresented his identity
during a telephone conversation and obtained an invitation to visit Lewis's
home to purchase narcotics." 4 The officer came to the home and
consummated the illegal purchase. 5 At a later visit to the home, the officer
178. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,466 (1928) (emphasis added).
179. Lopez, 373 U.S. at 465 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180. See id. at 429-32 for the Court's discussion of the facts in Lopez.
181. Compare Lopez, 373 U.S. at 465 (Brennan, J., dissenting) with Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466
(Ta, C.J.).
182. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
183. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
184. Lewis, 385 U.S. at 207.
185. Id.
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made another illegal purchase. 186 The narcotics and the officer's testimony
about his conversations with Lewis were admitted at trial.
18 7
In upholding Lewis's conviction, the Court was careful to frame the issue
narrowly. Chief Justice Warren emphasized that there was no question about
whether a "search" of Lewis's home had occurred or whether "anything other
than the purchased narcotics [had been] taken away.""' The only issues were
whether "in the absence of a warrant, any official intrusion upon the privacy
of a home constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation" and whether "the fact
[that] the suspect invited the intrusion can[ be held a waiver when the
invitation was induced by fraud and deception."' 89
Not surprisingly, Lewis urged that Gouled controlled.' 90 The Chief Justice
disagreed. Gouled, according to the Chief Justice, involved a "secret and
general ransacking" while the target was absent. 9 ' In contrast to Gouled, the
officer in Lewis did not "see, hear, or take anything that was not
contemplated, and in fact intended, by [Lewis] as a necessary part of his
illegal business."'92 A different result would amount "to a rule that the use of
undercover agents in any manner is virtually unconstitutional per se."1
93
Well aware that the undercover officer had entered Lewis's home, the
Chief Justice maintained that generally one's home was "accorded the full
range of Fourth Amendment protections"--but not in this case. 94 Where a
home
is converted into a commercial center to which outsiders are invited
for purposes of transacting unlawful business, that business is
entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a store, a
garage, a car, or on the street. A government agent, in the same
manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to do business
and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes
contemplated by the occupant.'95
Without saying so directly, the Chief Justice inferred that by selling
186. Id. at 207-08.
187. Id. at 208.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 209.
191. Id. at210.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 211.
195. Id.
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narcotics Lewis had "waived" his Fourth Amendment right against a secret
and deliberate government invasion of his home.'96 What the Chief Justice
implied, concurring Justice Brennan made explicit: "[Lewis's] apartment was
not an area protected by the Fourth Amendment as related to the transactions
in the present case."' 97 Professing allegiance to a broad view of the
Amendment, Justice Brennan insisted that a homeowner can "waive his right
to privacy" and does so "to the extent that he opens his home to the
transaction of business and invites anyone willing to enter to come in to trade
with him.' '19
8
On the same day that Lewis was decided, the Court also issued its opinion
in Hoffa v. United States.'9 There, a government informant reported to the
FBI incriminating conversations overheard while a member of Jimmy Hoffa's
entourage, including conversations that were spoken inside Hoffa's hotel
suite."' Finding it unimportant to the constitutional issue, the Court chose not
to decide whether the government had "placed" the informant inside Hoffa's
circle of friends and advisers.2' Instead of ruling on narrow grounds, as it did
in Lewis, the Hoffa Court spoke broadly.
Borrowing much of his reasoning from Justice Brennan's earlier opinions
in Lopez and Lewis, Justice Stewart stated that it was "evident that no interest
legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment [was] involved" in Hoffa.0 2
Justice Stewart noted that the informant had not entered Hoffa's suite "by
force or by stealth."' 3 Nor was there any surreptitious eavesdropping."
Because the informant had been given access to the hotel suite and had been
allowed to hear and to participate in incriminating conversations, Justice
196. Interestingly, Chief Justice Warren never uses the term "consent" in explaining why the entry
in Lewis was reasonable. This omission is understandable. There was no valid consent because Lewis
was unaware of the officer's official status. As Professor Weinreb has cogently noted, the notion that
consent to enter a home can be obtained by police officials through fraud and deceit is obviously
unsound. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 47, 67
(1974).
197. Lewis, 385 U.S. at 213 (Brennan, J., concurring).
198. Id.
199. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
200. Id. at 296.
201. Id. at 299. Edward Grady Partin, the informant in Hoffa, was "a jailbird languishing in a
Louisiana [prison]" when he was put in contact with the Justice Department after insisting that he
could help convict Jimmy Hoffa. Id. at 317 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). For a detailed discussion of
Partin's involvement with the "Get-Hoffa Squad" of the Justice Department, see VICTOR S. NAVASKY,
KENNEDY JUSTICE 419-24 (1971).
202. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.
203. Id.
204. Id.
[VOL. 74:573
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol74/iss3/5
INFORMANTS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Stewart concluded that Hoffa had in effect forfeited his right to rely on the
security of his hotel suite.2"5 All that could be said about Hoffa's
constitutional interest was that "he was relying upon his misplaced
confidence that [the informant] would not reveal his wrongdoing.' 206
Such "misplaced confidence," according to Hoffa, had never been
afforded Fourth Amendment protection.2 7 Recalling the unanimity of the
Lopez Court regarding the revenue agent's oral testimony, Justice Stewart
resurrected and recast Justice Brennan's assumption of risk theory into an
attractive clich6: The Fourth Amendment does not protect "a wrongdoer's
misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his
wrongdoing will not reveal it."
208
With Hoffa, the Court had finally arrived at a consensus to justify secret
and deliberate government surveillance of our private lives and conversations.
This form of governmental intrusion does not implicate the Constitution
because "no interest legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment is
involved."'  Under this view, whenever we choose to invite someone into
our homes or offices or to discuss private matters with another, we assume the
risk that the person may be a government spy. By conducting our lives in this
manner, we "waive' the protection that the Fourth Amendment normally
provides against official intrusions, and we "consent" to a secret police search
of our homes or to the seizure of our words.
205. Id.
206. Id. (footnote omitted).
207. Id.
208. Id. Justice Stewart's disregard of even the narrow view of Gouled is obvious. First, the fact
that "Partin [the informant] did not enter [Hoffa's] suite by force or stealth," id. at 302, is irrelevant for
constitutional purposes because Gouled had established that both stealthy and forcible intrusions are
searches under the Fourth Amendment. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305 (1921) ("[it is
impossible to successfully contend that a like search and seizure would be a reasonable one if only
admission were obtained by stealth instead of by force or coercion.").
Moreover, Justice Stewart's efforts to distinguish Hoffa's behavior from the risk assumed by
Gouled is quite unconvincing when one recalls the circumstances of Gouled. Justice Stewart made
much of the fact that Hoffa knew that Partin would overhear any incriminating conversations. Hoffa,
385 U.S. at 302. Thus, Hoffa could not invoke the protection of the Fourth Amendment because he had
relied on the "misplaced confidence" that Partin would not reveal Hoffa's misdeeds. Id. But Gouled
assumed the same risk assumed by Hoffa. Justice Stewart's
distinction does not show that Hoffa any more than Gouled was chargeable with "misplaced
confidence," or that he had "assumed a risk" different from that assumed by Gouled. On the
contrary, both men could have shielded their secrets by precisely the same device: by not
trusting friends. Each man failed to consider the possibility that the police had enlisted a
friend to collect evidence from a place where the state could not otherwise reach.
William D. Iverson, Note, Judicial Control of SecretAgents, 76 YALE L.J. 994,1012 (1967).
209. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.
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Put another way, because we live in a society where an individual is free
to choose whether to associate or to communicate with another, that freedom
is exercised at the individual's own peril. Because one has this freedom, law
enforcement officers may exploit it. They may use fraud, deceit, and stealth to
obtain information from individuals who unwittingly invite covert informants
and spies into their lives.
The Court's settlement of the scope of the Fourth Amendment after Lopez,
Lewis, and Hoffa might be easier to accept if the Court had directly addressed
Gouled. Unfortunately, no serious effort was made to analyze the
constitutional core of Gouled. The Gouled Court was unyielding in its view
that a secret government scheme to enter a home or office to obtain
information is a "search" under the Fourth Amendment." ' Hoffa, on the other
hand, relies on Justice Brennan's risk analysis for the conclusion that a secret
police entry does not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny.2" In reality, Justice
Brennan's "assumption of risk" model ignored this aspect of Gouled. While
subsequent rulings have relied on Justice Brennan's risk theory, Gouled's
conclusion that the Fourth Amendment protects against stealthy entries
obtained by trick or disguise has been dismissed with a notation that the
current case under review involves'a defendant who "consented" or "invited"
the government agent's presence and who "intended" that the agent obtain the
incriminating information that was eventually seized.
The Court's subsequent cases ignore the fact that Gouled never adopted
the government's submission that Gouled had "consented" to the entry of his
home." The best that can be said about the government's consent claim is
that the Gouled Court remained neutral on the point. My reading of Gouled
proffers a more substantive position: Gouled rejected the view that fictive
notions of consent or waiver would trump Fourth Amendment liberties. It
must be recalled that the Gouled Court dismissed the following submissions:
(a) Gouled had "granted permission" for a police entry into his office; (b) the
entry was constitutional because the informant had entered "a place of
business ... open to the public"; and (c) the informant's exploitation of "the
personal relations existing between [h-imself and Gouled]" sanctioned his
access to the incriminating information.
2'13
Without disputing the accuracy of these factual assertions, Gouled ruled
210. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 202-08 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
213. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 301 (1921) (argument of the United States
government).
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that secret intrusions are controlled by the Fourth Amendment
notwithstanding the unwitting consent of the target.2'14 The logic behind
Gouled's unbending rejection of the government's consent and waiver
arguments was summarized forty-five years later: "[W]hen a homeowner
invites a friend or business acquaintance into his home, he opens his house to
a friend or acquaintance, not a government spy.25
D. Katz v. United States: A New Way of Thinking About the Fourth
Amendment?
One year after Lewis and Hoffa were decided, the Court's ruling in Katz v.
United States"6 initiated a new way of looking at the Fourth Amendment. In
Katz, FBI agents attached an electronic listening and recording device to the
outside of a public telephone to monitor the conversations of the defendant
Katz, who was suspected of being involved in illegal wagering.217 After
rejecting the litigants' formulation of the issues,2" 8 the Katz Court signaled
that the old ways of thinking about search and seizure were no longer
acceptable.
For starters, Katz announced that the Fourth Amendment did not grant a
general "right to privacy."219 Without recognizing that it was doing so, Katz
echoed a theme implicit in Gouled when it stated that the Fourth Amendment
"protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion,
but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at
all." 2" The Court also explained that the scope of the Amendment could not
be measured simply by focusing on whether a particular "area" is
"constitutionally protected." 2 ' A more nuanced approach was necessary
because
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to
214. Id. at 305-06.
215. Osbom v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 346 (1966) (Douglas, J.). Years later, the Court would
recognize the wisdom of this point, albeit in a different context. See infra notes 288-300 and
accompanying text.
216. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
217. Id. at348.
218. Id. at 349-50.
219. Id. at350.
220. Id. (footnote omitted).
221. Id. at351.
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preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.222
Finally, Katz extinguished the lingering notion that physical invasion by the
government was necessary to trigger constitutional review of governmental
searches and seizures. Acknowledging the steady judicial trend away from the
rationale that supported Olmstead, Katz declared that "the reach of [the
Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical
intrusion into any given enclosure."'2
Equipped with this new way of thinking about the Fourth Amendment, the
Katz Court concluded that wiretapping without judicial authorization violated
the Constitution.224 While conceding that Katz had chosen to make his illegal
calls in a public place, this fact was not dispositive because "what [Katz]
sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye-it
was the uninvited ear. 2" By using the telephone in a conventional manner,
Katz was "surely entitled to assume that the words he utter[ed] into the
mouthpiece w[ould] not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution
more narrowly [would be] to ignore the vital role that the public telephone
has come to play in private communication."
' 6
While Katz fostered a new approach, it did not take long to see that the
222. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted). This quote from Katz can be misunderstood. Although what
a person "knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not" protected by the
Fourth Amendment, the police should not be excused from constitutional restrictions merely because
they can point to some knowing exposure to the public by an individual. For example, I knowingly
expose the privacy of my home to a cleaning service every two weeks. Anyone who stays at a hotel
also knowingly exposes the privacy of his or her room to cleaning personnel every day. Both places,
however, retain Fourth Amendment protection notwithstanding the fact that there has been a knowing
exposure to some members of the public. Cf. Joseph D. Grano, Perplexing Questions About Three
Basic Fourth Amendment Issues: Fourth Amendment Activity, Probable Cause, and the Warrant
Requirement, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 425, 432 n.70 (1978) ("To immunize conduct from
[F]ourth [A]mendment scrutiny, the government should make its observations in the same manner as
that available to any member of the public.").
On the other hand, imagine that I leave contraband on the kitchen counter in plain view of anyone
whom I admit to my home. Ifa police officer disguises himself as a cleaning person and I admit him to
my abode unaware of his official status, does the Fourth Amendment have anything to say about his
conduct? I hope so. Although I have knowingly exposed my home to a member of the public, that
disclosure was not made to the public. On the contrary, it was a limited exposure to a single individual.
More importantly, I did not expose my privacy to the government, nor did I consent to any police
intrusion. While the Fourth Amendment offers no protection against private intrusions, it is concerned
with police intrusions. For Fourth Amendment purposes, the difference between a knowing exposure
to a third party and a knowing exposure to the government is crucial.
223. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
224. Id. at 358-59.
225. Id. at 352.
226. Id.
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new mode of thinking would not change the law governing the age-old use of
informers and secret spies. United States v. White,227 a case that closely
mirrored the facts of On Lee,228 soon came before the Court. A plurality of the
Court in White found that Katz did not affect the rationale supporting Lopez,
Lewis or Hoffa.229 In fact, the White plurality could find nothing in Katz that
undermined the reasoning of On Lee."0 Thus, the plurality reaffirmed On
Lee's understanding that the Fourth Amendment would be ill-served if its
protection were equated with "spurious liberties improvised by farfetched
analogies which would liken eavesdropping on a conversation, with the
connivance of one of the parties, to an unreasonable search or seizure."
231
At issue in White was whether the testimony of federal officers about
conversations between the defendant and a government informant, which
were overheard by the officers monitoring the frequency of a radio transmitter
carried by the informant, implicated the Fourth Amendment.232 The Court
answered in the negative.
Acknowledging the Court's prior holdings, the White plurality explained
that if an individual assumes the risk that a secret informant, acting without
electronic equipment, might later reveal the contents of a conversation, the
risk is the same when the informant simultaneously records and transmits the
conversation to a third party. 4 In either situation, "the risk is his," and the
Fourth Amendment offers no protection against police efforts to obtain
information in this manner."3
227. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
228. In White, like in On Lee the defendant's conversations with a government informant were
transmitted by radio to listening government agents. Id. at 746-47; On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747,748-49 (1951).
229. See White, 401 U.S. at 749 (plurality opinion).
230. Id. at 750 (plurality opinion).
231. Id. at 750 (plurality opinion) (quoting On Lee, 343 U.S. at 753-54). In United States v.
Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 744 & n.2 (1979), a majority of the Court indicated its acceptance of the
rationale of the White plurality.
232. White, 401 U.S. at 746-47.
233. See id. at 747.
234. Id. at 751 (plurality opinion). "If the law gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted
accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither should it protect him when that same agent has
recorded or transmitted the conversations which are later offered in evidence to prove the State's case."
Id. at 752 (plurality opinion).
235. Id. at 752-53 (plurality opinion).
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III. THE SUPREME COURT'S INFORMANT CASES REST UPON A MISTAKEN
NOTION OF PRIVACY
If society's sole concern was the identification and prosecution of criminal
behavior, the Court's informant rulings would be logical. But our nation also
has an interest in the preservation of the freedoms embodied in the Bill of
Rights. From this perspective, the logic of the Court's cases is much less
impressive.
Consider the result in Lewis, the least controversial of the Court's secret
spy cases. Some see no constitutional harm where a covert agent enters a
home to purchase narcotics from someone like Lewis, "because the only
ordinariness of life that would be so protected is the expectation that an
apparent criminal is what he appears to be." 6 An undercover operation like
that in Lewis "expose to police spying only those people who express to
strangers a willingness to engage in criminal activity." 7 Professor LaFave
has also suggested that the key point in Lewis is that the undercover officer
"indicated in advance that it was his purpose to participate in the criminal
activity.
' 23
At first glance, Lewis does appear to be an easy case. One may wonder
why the Court even decided to review Lewis in light of the holdings in On
Lee and Lopez. z 9 But on further study, Lewis is a very troubling case.
First, despite the Court's efforts to downplay the point,240 the facts showed
236. White, supra note 24, at 230; see also Sanford Levinson, Under Cover: The Hidden Costs of
Infiltration, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Aug. 1982, at 29, 33 (accepting Professor White's rationale as
"persuasive" provided that (a) society can "agree on what counts as (properly) criminal conduct" and
(b) undercover agents only learn about a suspect's "willingness to continue violating the law").
237. White, supra note 24, at 230; see also Josephson, supra note 141, at 1605 (There is no need
for judicial authorization "where the informant is merely ordered to make a buy of drugs and the
seller's 'trust and confidence' arises entirely within the context of an illegal transaction. There is no
social utility to a purely illegal relationship.").
Others have accepted Lewis because the defendant, under the circumstances, unreasonably
assumed a risk that the person he was dealing with would not reveal his misdeeds to the government.
See Iverson, supra note 208, at 1011 (proposing multi-factor test that considers "where [a)
conversation is carried on; to whom [an] individual is speaking; and the circumstances leading to [a]
conversation"); Eric F. Saunders, Case Comment, Electronic Eavesdropping and the Right to Privacy,
52 B.U. L. REV. 831, 844 (1972) ("When one speaks confidentially with another, he assumes the
patent risk that the listener will disclose the substance of the conversation to a third person.").
238. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 63, § 8.2(m), at 703; see also YALE KAMISAR ET AL., THE SUM AND
SUBSTANCE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 122-25 (1977) (explaining Lewis as a case where the defendant
voluntarily chose to reveal his illegal conduct to anyone interested in participating).
239. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS AND
QUESTIONS 388 (8th ed. 1994).
240. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206,211 (1966).
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a police entry of Lewis's home that was neither authorized by a warrant nor
an exigency. Even if some doubt about the matter existed in 1963 when Lewis
was decided,24' that lack of authorization alone triggers the most scrupulous
protection under the Constitution and the Court's current precedents.242
Second, the waiver theory relied upon by Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Brennan proves too much. Imagine that the police are strongly convinced that
a house is filled with illegal weapons. Imagine further that the police also
have solid evidence that the owner willingly sells the weapons to anyone who
can produce sufficient cash. Can the police enter the house without a warrant
because the owner obviously does not use it as a home and thus, for
constitutional purposes, has "waive[d] his right to privacy" '243 by converting
the premises into an unlawful weapons storage facility? The answer, of
course, is no. Despite the suspect's illegal conduct, there is no "waiver" of his
Fourth Amendment rights.2' Therefore, the fact that Lewis sold drugs from
his home should be irrelevant245
The reasoning of Lewis is more typical of the Burger or Rehnquist Courts'
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence than that of the Warren Court. Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Brennan emphasized that Lewis had turned his
home into a commercial center for the sale of narcotics.246 Such conduct
evidently excused the otherwise illegal, warrantless police entry of his home.
This logic is regrettable. A Fourth Amendment entry of a home cannot "be
made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad when it starts and does
not change character from its success.' 247 When the police agent entered
241. But ef Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("At the very core [of the Fourth
Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion."); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16-17 (1948).
242. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a
firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably
be crossed without a warrant."); see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984)
("Searches and seizures inside a home without warrant are presumptively unreasonable absent exigent
circumstances."); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211 (1981) ("Except in ... special
situations, we have consistently held that the entry into a home to conduct a search or make an arrest is
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless done pursuant to a warrant.").
243. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 213 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring).
244. Cf Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (no waiver of Fourth Amendment rights by
using a public telephone to conduct illegal gambling operations).
245. Cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294,311 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A barn, like a
home, may simultaneously be put to domestic and nondomestic uses, even the manufacture of drugs.
Dual use does not strip a home or any building within the curtilage of Fourth Amendment
protection.").
246. See Lewis, 385 U.S. at 211 (Warren, C.J.); id. at 213 (Brennan, 3., concurring).
247. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,595 (1948) (footnote omitted).
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Lewis's home without a warrant, the consent of Lewis, or exigent
circumstances, his actions were bad from the start. His unconstitutional
behavior cannot be justified by what he discovers once inside.
Nor should our attitude about the Fourth Amendment's protection of
privacy change whenever the police are able to obtain entry to a home via
stealth or trickery. As its text suggests, the Fourth Amendment provides
substantive, not just procedural, protection against unreasonable
governmental intrusion.24 Therefore, the concept of waiver of "[t]he right of
the people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures"
249
must be defined in a principled manner. Central to the Lewis Court's
conception of waiver is the fact that Lewis had "invited the undercover agent
to his home." °
For constitutional purposes, however, this "invitation" is neither a valid
waiver nor a reasonable consent to enter.25' One may consent to a private
party's entrance to one's home, but such consent is a far cry from consent to a
police search. Some skeptics wonder why the police should be restricted from
obtaining access to a home or recording a conversation when a private person
acting independently of the police can do the same thing. The difference is
that the Fourth Amendment imposes on police conduct limits that do not
apply to private persons.252 Moreover, the Amendment recognizes that
certain interests deserve special protection from police scrutiny. The
Amendment does not impose an impenetrable barrier to unconsented police
intrusion, but it does require compliance with certain procedural safeguards
before an intrusion is permitted. This historical judgment and constitutional
norm regarding police entries is pertinent whether the police choose an overt
entry with badges and weapons drawn or a covert entry with badges and
weapons concealed. 53
248. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S. Ct. 807, 827 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
249. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
250. Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210.
251. Suppose, for example, that the police deployed a squad of men to pose as gas and
electric
company inspectors in order to make a general survey of the contents of cellars. Plainly, the
[F]ourth [A]mendment would prohibit such a practice, notwithstanding that the "inspector"
was invited to enter in each case. We do regard deliberate deception about an obviously
material-indeed controlling-fact as inconsistent with voluntariness.
Weinreb, supra note 196, at 67.
252. As Justice White ironically recognized, the distinction highlighted by skeptics focuses "on
relationships between private parties, but the Fourth Amendment is concerned with the relationship of
one of those parties to the govemment." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 167-68 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting).
253. Professor Grano, in a thoughtful reply to the concerns raised by Professor Weinreb's
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In the final analysis, many accept the result in Lewis because the
defendant was selling drugs in his home, and the covert entry efficiently and
effectively identified that crime. This "deny-the-guilty-their-rights" mode of
Fourth Amendment analysis would be unfamiliar to the Boston merchants
who retained James Otis, Jr., to oppose the writs of assistance .2 4 Moreover, it
is unprincipled constitutional decision-making. "A home is still a sanctuary,
however the owner may use it." 5 Whatever my motives, when I open my
front door to a fiiend, to an overnight delivery worker, or to a complete
stranger, access is afforded only to those whom I knowingly admit. If the
police want access to my home, they should follow lawful procedure. At
times, stealthy entries may be necessary; but under the Constitution, the
police cannot decide by themselves when they will enter a home.
Similar criticism applies to Hoffa. Our constitutional ancestors did not
criticism of Lewis, see Weinreb, supra note 196, argues that Weinreb's hypothetical of a squad of
government agents posing as utility inspectors is distinguishable from Lewis. Grano, supra note 222, at
438 n.l 14. According to Grano, "[t]he agent in Lewis only provided an opportunity for the defendant
to commit a crime; the agents in Professor Weinreb's hypothetical would obviously intrude upon the
justifiable privacy expectations of innocent and guilty people alike." Id.
While Grano is highly critical of the Court's informant cases, see id. at 432-37, he submits that
Lewis was probably correctly decided because
the police conduct in Lewis, unlike that in Hoffa, did not constitute a threat to any justifiable
expectation of privacy.... [A] simple request for an individual to sell narcotics can only
ascertain whether that individual is willing to do so. The request in Lewis, unlike the spying in
Hoffa, posed no threat to justifiable expectations of informational privacy.
Idl at 438 (footnote omitted).
Although I agree that there are significant distinctions between Hoffa and Lewis, see Edmund W.
Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits ofthe Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 133, 150, these
differences do not support the reasoning and result in Lewis. As Professor Grano recognizes, Lewis's
disclosure was not offered to the general public, but instead was "only a limited disclosure." Grano,
supra note 222, at 434 n.94; see id. at 437 n. 111. Moreover, the fact that Lewis's disclosure concerned
an illegal transaction that the government was able to predict in advance does not justify a warrantless
intrusion of his privacy. Even in cases where the police know with absolute certainty that illegal
conduct is occurring, the Court has repeatedly said that, absent exigent circumstances, uniformed
police agents may not enter a home without a warrant. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468
(1971) (plurality opinion).
Thus, under the Fourth Amendment, one has a justifiable privacy interest against overt police
entries in situations even where the government is certain of criminality. It is not apparent why that
same privacy interest is no longer justifiable when the government chooses to enter a home covertly,
particularly given that Gouled drew no distinction between an overt, forceful entry and a covert,
stealthy one. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1921).
254. "The mercantile community of the Bay Colony challenged writs of assistance because they
threatened not only civil rights but the smuggling from which that community profited.... Opposing
the writs made sound business sense." Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 802-03. But cf. Stuntz, supra note
53, at 409 ("The dispute over the writs, in short, had at least as much to do with the regulation of
trade-with the substance of the rules being enforced-as with general principles of search and
seizure.").
255. Osborne v. United States, 385 U.S. 323,346 (1966) (Douglas, J.).
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trust the officers who entered their homes and businesses to determine
whether they were complying with the law; the Fourth Amendment was the
response to the discretionary power that customs agents possessed to invade
the privacy of early Americans. Relying on the reasonableness and good faith
of law enforcement officers to guarantee the "right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures" 6 was a foolish proposition for those who urged the creation of
the Fourth Amendment. Yet, this is exactly the regime authorized by Hoffa.
If one accepts the fundamental historical point that the Fourth Amendment
reflected the colonists' distrust of the police power and was designed to limit
the discretionary power of the police to invade one's home, it becomes
paradoxical for the Hoffa Court to allow law enforcement officers unchecked
discretion to plant spies and informants into one's privacy. Like the customs
officers who forced open the doors of colonial homes, the secret informant is
on a similar mission for the state. "The modem police undercover agent
operation is in purpose, if not in detail, the same as any traditional police
investigative technique: to gather information from and about private citizens
on possible violations of the law.' ' u7
If one of the values protected by the Fourth Amendment is freedom from
discretionary police intrusion of the home or office, that norm is doubly
offended in cases like Hoffa because the target chosen for scrutiny at the
whim of the police "does not even know that he is ringed by the state, his
reactions probed and his words marked."2 8
The Court found Hoffa's privacy interests illegitimate because the Fourth
Amendment does not protect "a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it."'59 This
statement is specious because the informant in Hoffa was not a friend who
256. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
257. Lundy, supra note 67, at 664. This statement is certainly true in Hoffa. Partin, the informant
in Hoffa, did not arrive at Hoffa's hotel suite by accident.
Partin made an effort to spend as much time as possible in the suite, and the government not
only encouraged him to do so but made it possible for him to be in Nashville to do so.... The
penetration was active and deliberate; Hoffa's willingness to talk freely there was not merely
a consequence of his 'misplaced confidence' in Partin, but also of his assumption that the
government would not attempt to spy on him in the privacy of his hotel room.
Iverson, supra note 208, at 1012.
258. Iverson, supra note 208, at 1011; see also Christopher Slobogin, The World Without A
Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 104 (1991) (informant spying "is more inimical" to privacy
interests than other searches "[b]ecause it allows the government to use personal and commercial
relationships for investigative purposes unbeknownst to the target, ... open[ing] up to government
inspection virtually all of those affairs that are shared with anyone else").
259. Hoffav. United States, 385 U.S. 293,302 (1966).
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subsequently decided to betray Jimmy Hoffa, but a government spy right
from the start.2" More importantly, the Court's description of the
constitutional interest at stake in Hoffa turns upside down the value system
inherent in the Fourth Amendment When positive proof that an individual
has committed a crime exists in the traditional search and seizure context, the
burden is still on the state to justify and to limit the intrusion.
Consider again the hypothetical case where the police know that a house is
being used to store illegal weapons. Or, consider a case where the police have
good reason to believe that a defendant has murdered a child and evidence of
the crime is in his home.26' No one familiar with the history of the Fourth
Amendment would suggest that these defendants' constitutional interests are
illegitimate, thus permitting a search of their homes without a warrant simply
because these defendants may have miscalculated society's willingness to
respect their privacy in the face of serious governmental interests.
In the secret spy cases, however, Fourth Amendment values are reversed.
After Hoffa, the government need not first assemble objective evidence of
wrongdoing to covertly invade the homes and offices of its citizens. After
Hoffa, the government may bypass neutral judicial authorization for the
intrusion sought by its undercover agents. After Hoffa, secret spying missions
need not particularize the person, place, and nature of the conversations
subject to surveillance and recording. Whatever the informant sees and hears,
regardless of the nexus to criminal behavior, is information known to the
police. After Hoffa, such wide-ranging surveillance is without time limit and
260. As Professor Kitch has explained:
mhe reality to which Hoffa was exposed was not that Partin would decide to tell but that he
was in fact working for the government at the very time Hoffa spoke. Partin did not turn out
to be a friend who later "revealed wrongdoing." He was exactly what he did not appear to
be-a government agent-and Hoffa was induced to speak to him because of this very
deception. It is one thing to say that people must take the risk that their friends will report
wrongdoing. It is another to say that people must take the risk that their friends have already
promised to report whatever they do and say to the government.
Kitch, supra note 253, at 151-52.
Summarizing the Court's prior precedents in United States v. White, Justice White stated that "the
law gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a police agent" 401
U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). The phrase "is or becomes" is important.
Because the Fourth Amendment is concerned with government action, it offers no protection against a
friend or accomplice who, in effect, "becomes" a police source by subsequently revealing private
information to the authorities. Where, however, the friend "is" a police agent from the start, his
surveillance activities implicate Fourth Amendment interests. Justice White, of course, never made this
distinction. Nevertheless, there is a big difference between a person acting independently of the police
who "becomes" the reservoir of private information for the police and a person sent or encouraged by
the police who "is" a police agent from the very start.
261. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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need not be supervised by a judge.
While there is no proof that most law-abiding individuals would rebel
against such a regime if they were targeted like Hoffa, fortunately such proof
is unnecessary. The Fourth Amendment does not bar only those intrusions
that the citizenry reasonably condemns or require that individuals rely on the
"good faith and self-restraint" of law enforcement.2 62 Rather, the Fourth
Amendment is a positive check on discretionary power whenever the
government intrudes upon the "right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects,"26 irrespective of whether the people are
innocent or guilty. Therefore, Hoffa was wrong in holding that the Fourth
Amendment offers no protection against spies and undercover agents who
invade our homes and offices.
A. Assumption of Risk Theory
The informant cases embrace "risk analysis." The White plurality
reaffirmed the Court's commitment to the risk theory first elaborated in
Justice Brennan's Lopez dissent.2" For the plurality, the intervening decision
in Katz was irrelevant. Although Katz announced that the Court would no
longer be controlled by rigid and antiquated concepts when formulating the
scope of the Fourth Amendment,2 65 the White plurality read Katz as having no
262. One commentator's criticism of United States v. White is equally applicable to Hoffa:
Those people who assume that government agents will act with self-restraint and respect the
privacy of innocent citizens may overlook or dismiss the possible impact of electronic
eavesdropping on private conversation. Whether this assumption is warranted or not, it is not
a substitute for the protection provided by a judicial determination of probable cause. If the
[F]ourth [A]mendment were premised on the good faith and self-restraint of police, its
controls would be superfluous. Instead, it functions as a check on abuses of authority and the
worst tendencies of government which courts should anticipate whenever the police are given
an unrestricted license to employ such investigative techniques as electronic eavesdropping.
Saunders, supra note 237, at 842-43.
263. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
264. See supra notes 227-35 and accompanying text.
265. While it has been rightly described as an innovation in the Court's thinking, Katz did not
impose, as one might expect the Fourth Amendment would, an affirmative duty on the government to
respect the privacy of its citizens. As Professor Gutterman has observed:
By focusing on the precautions that Katz took, the Court disclosed that it might not believe in
an "entitlement theory," a right of the people to expect their government to respect their
privacy. The Katz formula could, if desired, be used to protect only those sensible persons
who had the foresight to take precautions to keep their property, activities, and even ideas
hidden from public view. By grasping upon this particular ingredient of the Katz formula,
major significance could be given to the lack of protective means used to shield otherwise
private conduct.
Gutterman, supra note 113, at 664 (footnote omitted).
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impact on the secret spy cases.
After offering a meaningless reference to Katz's "expectations of privacy"
model,2 the White plurality did not pause to consider whether the doctrinal
shift declared in Katz demanded a reversal, or at least a reconsideration, of
cases like On Lee, Lewis, and Hoffa. The plurality simply restated the
conclusions of earlier cases by noting that the law permits unchecked
invasion of privacy where informants can be found to gather information for
the police.267 Instead of a discussion or explanation of whether the Katz model
conflicted with the risk analysis of earlier cases, the White plurality gave new
life to a theory that had never been harmonized with the foundation
established in Gouled.
As applied, risk analysis establishes a de jure waiver of constitutional
protection, even though the citizen is unaware and never informed that such a
waiver has occurred. From the Court's perspective, risk analysis is a useful
doctrinal tool because wired informants are given the same license to infiltrate
homes and offices as informants without electronic devices.26 Moreover,
when the constitutional issue is framed in terms of the risks assumed by
criminals,269 the Court can always play a trump card favoring law
enforcement interests: reliable evidence of a defendant's guilt may be
obtained by the informant's intrusion.27° This reasoning is attractive if one is
bent on bringing criminals to book. While the logic of White emerges
266. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,752 (1971) (plurality opinion).
267. Id. According to the White plurality, if the intrusions permitted in Hoffa and Lewis are
constitutionally valid, it is a short and logical step to accept equivalent intrusions where the informant
is wired for sound. "If the law gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or
becomes a police agent, neither should it protect him when that same agent has recorded or transmitted
the conversations which are later offered in evidence to prove the State's case." Id. (citation omitted).
Although there is much to criticize in White, I see little difference between wired and unwired
informants. As Professor Grano has already noted: "From the perspective of informational privacy...
bugged and unbugged informants are difficult to distinguish." Grano, supra note 222, at 435; see also
Amsterdam, supra note 20, at 407 ("The only difference [between an informant wired for sound and an
informant without a wire] is that under electronic surveillance you are afraid to talk to anybody in your
office or over the phone, while under a spy system you are afraid to talk to anybody at all.").
268. White, 401 U.S. at 752-53 (plurality opinion) (finding no convincing evidence to justify
distinguishing "between the electronically equipped and the unequipped agent... substantial enough
to require discrete constitutional recognization, particularly under the Fourth Amendment which is
ruled by fluid concepts of 'reasonableness."')
269. See, e.g., id. at 752 ("Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk
that his companions may be reporting to the police. If he sufficiently doubts their trustworthiness, the
association will very probably end or never materialize. But if he has no doubts, or allays them, or
risks what doubt he has, the risk is his.").
270. See id. at 753 ("Nor should we be too ready to erect constitutional barriers to relevant and
probative evidence which is also accurate and reliable.").
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naturally from the Court's earlier precedents,27' the Court's risk analysis has
not generated widespread support off the bench. There are good reasons for
this unfavorable response.
First, the Court does not and cannot reconcile risk theory with the origins
of the Fourth Amendment. True, the use of secret informants has deep
historical roots.272 Moreover, the Framers of the Constitution left no specific
clues regarding their intent as to whether the Fourth Amendment would
regulate or forbid secret informants. The Framers also said nothing about
eavesdropping, but that omission did not justify leaving eavesdropping and its
modem equivalent, wiretapping, to the whims of the police.273
The Framers were initially preoccupied with the intrusions associated with
general warrants and writs of assistance.274 Those law enforcement tools were
especially loathsome because they permitted unchecked and promiscuous
invasions of the home. The Fourth Amendment was adopted to halt this type
of intrusion. In light of this history, is it fair to surmise that the Framers would
have favored an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that grants the
police absolute authority to send informants and secret spies into an
individual's home? Or, is it not more likely that the Framers, who despised
writs of assistance and general warrants because they allowed government
agents to search and seize at will,275 would have also opposed giving those
271. See Saunders, supra note 237, at 834-35. According to the White plurality, "a constitutional
license to employ secret agents generates the correlative right to electronically eavesdrop without prior
judicial authorization. If the government may lawfully invade an individual's privacy by using an
informer, the constitutional protection around his private conversation collapses." Id. at 835 (footnote
omitted).
272. See Iverson, supra note 208, at 994 n.1 (referring to "the espionage which [historically]
forms part of the administrative system of continental despotisms") (quoting 2 THOMAS E. MAY,
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 275 (1863)); Lundy, supra note 76, at 648 n.70 (quoting
congressman's distasteful description of a domestic spy network in 1798). One interesting historical
precedent occurred in 1580, when English officials used spies to infiltrate groups of Catholic priests
who had come to Britain to minister to their worshippers. Cuddihy, supra note 20, at 142.
273. But see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 366 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) ("There can be
no doubt that the Framers were aware of [eavesdropping], and if they had desired to outlaw or restrict
the use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping, I believe that they would have used the appropriate
language to do so in the Fourth Amendment.").
274. See supra Part I.
275. See LASSON, supra note 20, at 54, for an explanation that writs of assistance were more
arbitrary and open to abuse than general warrants.
The more dangerous element of the writ of assistance... was that it was not returnable at all
after execution, but was good as a continuous license and authority during the whole lifetime
of the reigning sovereign. The discretion delegated to the official was therefore practically
absolute and unlimited. The writ empowered the officer and his deputies and servants to
search, at their will, wherever they suspected uncustomed goods to be, and to break open any
receptacle or package falling under their suspecting eye.
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same agents absolute discretion to use secret informants in order to search and
seize at will? I believe that our constitutional ancestors, who proposed and
ratified the Fourth Amendment to bar government agents from entering the
front doors of their homes without a proper warrant, would have invoked the
same "realm of values" 76 inherent in the Amendment to bar secret spies and
informants from slipping into their homes via the back door without warrant
or adequate justification.
Even if the history of the Fourth Amendment is ignored, there are still
serious problems with the Court's risk theory. First, the Court's risk analysis
is a legal conclusion masquerading as legal analysis.277 The Court's opinions
have been transparent in their desire to affirm the convictions of guilty
defendants, while blinking at the implications of giving the police
untrammeled authority to unleash informants on the population.27
In some circumstances, a result-oriented approach is predictable in "hard"
Fourth Amendment cases. Governmental use of informants and secret spies,
however, hardly qualifies as such a case. On the eve of the Watergate scandal,
the White Court, like the rest of the nation, was well aware of the history and
abuse of governmental spying. Objectionable spying has always included the
use of informants to investigate individuals and infiltrate groups disfavored
by government officials.279 Aware of the history and impact of police spying
Id. (footnote omitted).
276. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,778 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
277. See Gutterman, supra note 113, at 674 ("The Court's risk exposure concept became a
conclusion, not a reasoned analysis of what privacy claims are desirable in a democratic society."); cf.
Ronald J. Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of the Fourth Amendment, 46
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 529, 541-42 (1978) (explaining how the Court's Fourth Amendment risk analysis
distorts and misconstrues traditional assumption of risk analysis).
278. See, e.g., White, 401 U.S. at 752 (plurality opinion) ("Inescapably, one contemplating illegal
activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police."); Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) ("Neither this Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the
view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he
voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it."); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211
(1966) ("But when, as here, the home is converted into a commercial center to which outsiders are
invited for purposes of transacting unlawful business, that business is entitled to no greater sanctity
than if it were carried on in a store, a garage, a car, or on the street."); id. at 213 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("The petitioner ... opened his apartment for the conduct of a business, the sale of
narcotics; the agent ... took nothing [from the apartment] except what would be taken away by any
willing purchaser. There was therefore no intrusion upon the 'sanctity' of petitioner's home or the
'privacies of life."'); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438 (1963) ("We decline to hold that
whenever an offer of a bribe is made in private, and the offeree does not intend to accept, that offer is a
constitutionally protected communication.").
279. See, e.g., DONNER, supra note 13, at 36-38 (noting the federal government's use of
informants in organizing and facilitating the Palmer raids in 1920); O'REILLY, supra note 13, at 7
(stating that FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover defended the FBI's infiltration and surveillance of civil
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in this sensitive area, the public was right to expect a more principled decision
than the one provided by the White Court, which simply outlined the
appropriate expectations and assumptions fit for criminals.
Second, there is no substantive distinction between the modem Court's
risk analysis and the Court's prior conclusion in Olmstead that an individual
who uses a telephone intends to project his voice to those outside. Why is the
former conclusion constitutionally reasonable but not the latter? There is no
more empirical support for the modem Court's conclusion that citizens
assume certain risks whenever they speak to a third party than there was for
the now-discredited assumption in Olmstead. And while the modem Court
has never suggested that this issue turns on an empirical evaluation, the
Court's normative judgment about informant spying is not convincing.
The White plurality insisted that wiretapping involves "no revelation to the
Government by a party to the conversations with the defendant."2 ' This
assertion is true, but the factual characterization of the mechanics of
wiretapping neither justifies nor explains the Court's legal conclusion about
the risks associated with informant spying. It merely begs the question, and
question begging cuts in many directions. The Court's assumption is equally
applicable to other contexts: If people like White and Hoffa assume the risk
that their companions are police agents, "then why does one using the phone
not 'assume the risk' that the police will be tapping the wire? And why does
one using the mails not assume that the police will be reading his letters? Are
these other risks small only because the Court has made them so?
'
r281
Seven decades ago, the Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment to
exclude private telephone conversation from constitutional protection.
Today's Court has rejected the literal approach of Olmstead and substituted
the "expectation of privacy" model, which considers "assumed risks, 2
2
rights groups as being done "for their own good"); Gary T. Marx, Thoughts on a Neglected Category
of Social Movement Participant: The Agent Provocateur and the Informant, 80 AM. J. SoC. 402 (1974)
(discussing the "origins and motives of informants" and "their roles in radical groups"); cf JOHN T.
ELLIFF, THE REFORM OF FBI INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 125 (1979).
Up to now the courts have not extended the warrant requirement to undercover informants, on
the theory that anyone who discusses criminal actions with another must assume the risk that
the other will inform. But the courts now have before them a record of widespread use of such
investigative tools as informants to report entirely lawful conversations and private activities,
as well as to take lawless disruptive action for the purpose of inhibiting political expression
and association.
ELLIFF, supra, at 125.
280. White, 401 U.S. at 749 (plurality opinion).
281. KAMISARETAL.,supra note 239, at 391 (citations omitted).
282. See. e.g., White, 401 U.S. at 752 (plurality opinion).
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"waived rights of privacy,"28 3 and "interests legitimately protected. 28 4 But
after all the legal jargon and question begging is stripped away, the Court
ultimately confronts a value judgment about government power. Professor
Amsterdam put it well when he said:
The ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgment. It is whether, if
the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is
permitted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount
of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished
to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open
society.285
The White plurality never addressed the reality that secret police
informants would target, just as wiretapping had targeted, the privacy and
security of all citizens, the guilty and innocent alike.286 Such stilted reasoning
is inevitable when the Court considers only the expectations of criminals. An
objective approach would have recognized that "[w]hat was at stake in White
was nothing less than the soul of Katz."287 We assume the police lack the
discretion to listen to telephone conversations because the Court has
interpreted the Constitution in a manner that requires the police to satisfy
certain legal safeguards before such intrusions may occur. That judgment was
not dictated by the words of the Constitution; it came instead from a distrust
of unchecked police power that threatens the interests embodied in the Fourth
Amendment. If the Fourth Amendment restrains the discretion of the police to
wiretap or "bug" private conversations, it is not apparent why that same
provision is inapplicable when the police monitor and record private
conversations through the use of a secret informant deliberately position to
hear those conversations. After all, a secret informant acts as a "human bug"
for the government. If there is a constitutional difference between
unrestrained wiretap surveillance and unrestrained informant spying, I have
not yet found it.
Interestingly, in other search and seizure contexts, the current Court has
shown signs that a risk analysis which focuses on the risks and assumptions
283. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206,210-12 (1966).
284. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,438-40 (1963).
285. Amsterdam, supra note 20, at 403.
286. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 114, at 34 ("[B]y the 1960's it had become apparent that,...
the privacy rights of thousands of Americans had been unlawfully violated." (footnote omitted)).
287. John M. Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of the Protection, 79 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105, 1172 (1989).
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of criminals, rather than "the expectation of the ordinary citizen," '288 distorts
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. For example, when deciding whether
a controversial police encounter triggers constitutional scrutiny, the Court
recently explained that the intrusiveness of police conduct must be judged
from the perspective of the innocent person.289 If this analysis is employed in
cases where informants are planted in homes or sent to record private
conversations, the flaw in the reasoning of the White plurality is manifest.29
The Court has also recognized that "an individual can have a reasonable
expectation of privacy against the government even though such an
expectation may not exist against certain private individuals."29' Adopting
reasoning contrary to the logic of his earlier opinion in White,29 Justice White
explained in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,293 that there is a critical difference
between governmental intrusion and a similar intrusion by a person not
affiliated with the government.29" Defending a scheme of warrantless
288. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 790 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
289. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991). Bostick ruled that no seizure under the Fourth
Amendment automatically occurs when police officers board a bus, randomly approach passengers,
ask to see their identification and tickets, and seek permission to search their luggage for illegal drugs.
Id. at 437. The test for determining whether a seizure occurs in this context is whether "a reasonable
person" would feel free to decline the police requests or terminate the encounter. Id. at 439. The so-
called "reasonable person" that the Court has in mind "presupposes an innocent person." Id. at 438.
290. When the Court is confronted with the impact of unchecked informant surveillance on the
innocent as well as the guilty, there is
no compelling reason why the privacy of one's home ought not to be protected against
deceptive as well as secretive and forcible intrusions. The Court's argument, that the risk that
persons in whom one confides will inform is inevitable in human affairs, is conclusory as
applied to government action: we must assume the risks only of those types of government
action which the Court has declared permissible.... If deceptive intrusions by government
agents were [accorded the same treatment given to forcible searches and wiretapping], this
risk would also be substantially lessened. The real question is what risks of government
intrusion ought a person be required to face.
The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv L. REV. 69, 193-94 (1967) (footnote omitted). It has also been
commented that:
[w]hen the innocent citizen is used as a model, ... risk analysis breaks down. The innocent
citizen, unlike the calculating criminal, does not assume the risk attendant to crime by
crossing the bounds of legality into an area of legitimate official interest. On the contrary,
these risks come to him when, as in White, the police are granted a license to unilaterally
decide whether to monitor his private activities by "bugging" an informer.
Saunders, supra note 237, at 843.
291. Grano, supra note 222, at 430; see also Gutterman, supra note 113, at 684-85 ("Risking
observation by a limited category of persons is not the equivalent of 'public exposure' and should not
displace privacy rights against 'government intrusion.") (footnote omitted).
292. See Grano, supra note 222, at 430-38.
293. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
294. Id. at314-15.
The critical fact in this case is that entry over Mr. Barlow's objection is being sought by a
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administrative inspections of factories for health and safety violations, the
government unsuccessfully argued that an employer has a diminished privacy
interest in those areas of a factory where employees and other third parties are
granted access.295 The disclosure of limited information to a private party,
Justice White explained, "furnishes no justification for federal agents to enter
a place of business from which the public is restricted and to conduct their
own warrantless search."'296 When measuring Fourth Amendment privacy
interests, "Barlow's indicates that the relevant question is the individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy vis-a-vis the government," not what has
been disclosed to a third party.2"
Consider, finally, the logic of United States v. Karo.29 There the Court
decided that a homeowner possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy
against warrantless monitoring of an electronic beeper located in his private
residence.2 In another opinion by Justice White, Karo rejected "the
Government's contention that it should be completely free from the
constraints of the Fourth Amendment to determine by means of an electronic
device, without a warrant and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion,
whether a particular article--or a person, for that matter-is in an individual's
home at a particular time."3"
What is the difference between the search proscribed in Karo and a search
that occurs in informant spying? Both involve police access to places and
activities "in which the individual normally expects privacy free of
governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant."3"1 As Justice White
acknowledged, if an agent in Karo had secretly entered the defendant's home
without a warrant to verify the location of the beeper-laden container, "there
Government agent. Employees are not being prohibited from reporting OSHA violations.
What they observe in their daily functions is undoubtedly beyond the employer's reasonable
expectation of privacy. The Government inspector, however, is not an employee.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); cf Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) (noting that
under the rationale of Katz, Fourth Amendment protection does not depend "upon a property right in the
invaded place but upon whether the area was one in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom
from governmental intrusion") (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Certainly the result in Barlow's would not have been different if, rather than demanding overt
entry into Barlow's factory, OSHA inspectors had disguised themselves as workers and searched the
premises as undercover agents.
295. Grano, supra note 222, at 429-30 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 29, Barlow's).
296. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 315 (footnote omitted).
297. Grano, supra note 222, at 431.
298. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
299. Id. at 714.
300. Id. at 716.
301. Id. at714.
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is little doubt that he would have engaged in an unreasonable search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 30 2
If that is so, why is an informant not engaged in a search when through
disguise or stealth he deliberately gains access to a home or office to gather
information valuable to the government? In words equally pertinent to
informant spying, Justice White explained why the Fourth Amendment
denies the police the untrammeled power to invade the privacy of a home:
"Indiscriminate monitoring of property [or conversation] that has been
withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy
interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment
oversight." 0
3
B. A Coherent Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment Would Treat
Government Informants the Same Way the Court Treats Governmental
Wiretapping
Not too long ago, many thoughtful persons believed that if Congress or
the Court sanctioned electronic wiretapping or bugging by law enforcement
officials, society would move toward an oppressive police state.3° Some
opponents of electronic surveillance argued that the Fourth Amendment
compelled an absolute prohibition on electronic wiretapping and bugging. 5
302. Id. at 715.
303. Id. at 716 (footnote omitted). In a footnote, Justice White responded to Justice O'Connor's
attempt to utilize the reasoning of the informant cases to sanction the beeper monitoring at issue in
Karo. In Justice White's view, "[a] homeowner takes the risk that his guest will cooperate with the
Government but not the risk that a trustworthy friend has been bugged by the Government without his
knowledge or consent." Id. at 716 n.4. This reply to Justice O'Connor's concerns is more assertion
than analysis. The scope of the Fourth Amendment should not depend on fortuitous events subject to
the manipulations of police agents who often have slight concern about constitutional interests. As
Justice O'Connor cogently noted,
[e]xpectations are formed on the basis of objective appearances, not on the basis of facts
known only to others.... The homeowner's expectation of privacy is either inherently
reasonable or it is inherently unreasonable. A guest's undisclosed status as a government
informant cannot alter the reasonableness of that expectation.
Id at 724 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment).
304. See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 174 (1967) (noting that during the first half of
the twentieth century, "the public ... displayed a nervous awareness that surveillance devices, if used
improperly or too widely by public or private authorities, could endanger legitimate personal and
group needs for privacy in a free society and could concentrate a menacing amount of power in the
hands of those collecting surveillance data"). See generally Kamisar, supra note 92 (detailing the pre-
1960 arguments raised by opponents of governmental wiretapping).
305. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 65-66 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring); Osborn v.
United States, 385 U.S. 323, 353 (1966) (Douglas J., dissenting) ("[Wiretapping and electronic
bugging] devices lay down a dragnet which indiscriminately sweeps in all conversations within its
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The rulings in Berger and Katz, however, signaled that the Court would
accept some form of regulated electronic surveillance. In 1968, Congress
accepted the Court's challenge and enacted a comprehensive law that
authorized electronic wiretapping and bugging so long as enumerated
constitutional and statutory limitations were followed."0 6 With the passage of
this law, the constitutional debate over wiretapping and bugging has largely
been put to rest.
30 7
While it rejected the view that law enforcement officials should be free to
wiretap or bug without restraint, Congress expressly sanctioned unchecked
informant spying, even though "[s]uch surveillance was far more frequent
than [wiretapping or electronic bugging]." 0" Perhaps Congress was
persuaded by the logic of On Lee and its progeny, or more likely, Congress
was unwilling to abandon an effective technique that the Court had declared
constitutionally permissible. Whatever their motives, Congress and the Court
have erred in exempting informant spying from the constitutional limitations
imposed on other forms of electronic surveillance. 3"
scope, without regard to the nature of the conversations, or the participants. A warrant authorizing such
devices is no different from the general warrants the Fourth Amendment was intended to prohibit.").
306. This law was enacted in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 211-23 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522
(1994)). For helpful analysis of Title III, see JAMES G. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE (1986); CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING (1978 & Supp.
1989); Goldsmith, supra note 114.
307. While the nation appears to have reached a consensus on the constitutional validity of the
nation's electronic surveillance laws, Professor Herman Schwartz has been a forceful critic. See
HERMAN SCHWARTZ, TAPS, BUGS AND FOOLING THE PEOPLE (1977); Herman Schwartz, The
Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order," 67 MICH. L. REV. 455
(1969).
308. Goldsmith, supra note 114, at 46 (footnote omitted). Congressional approval of informant
spying is referenced in 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(c) (1994), which provides: "It shall not be unlawful under
this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception." Id.
309. Some argue that judicial scrutiny of police informants is unnecessary, at least with respect to
federal investigations, because the Executive Branch has promulgated internal guidelines controlling
the use of informants and other undercover operations. Cf. John T. Elliff, The Attorney General's
Guidelines For FBI Investigations, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 785, 814 (1984) (noting, in the context of a
discussion about the FBI's charter, that FBI internal "guidelines have also demonstrated that judicial
enforcement is not essential to effective formal standards and procedures for FBI investigations").
Several responses seem appropriate. First, internal guidelines can be changed at any time. Second,
it is not for the Executive Branch to determine the scope of Fourth Amendment protections. Third, and
most critically, a review of the Attorney General's Guidelines reveals that the quantum of evidence
needed to authorize use of an informant is extremely minimal.
As set forth in the current Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering
Enterprise and Domestic SecuriO/Terrorism Investigations, FBI officials may initiate a full
investigation or "general crimes investigation ... when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that
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Some doubt, however, whether the safeguards of the Fourth Amendment
could or should be applied to informant spying. For example, it has been said
that because informants "must be developed or placed over a long period of
time and the objectives of their 'search' will almost always be broad and
impossible to delineate with any precision in advance," the particularity
requirement of the Amendment cannot be satisfied.310
This very argument was raised by Justice Douglas and others in their
a federal crime has been, is being, or will be committed." Memorandum from Dick Thomburgh,
Attorney General, on The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise
and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations § II.C(1), at 7 (Mar. 21, 1989) (on file with author)
(revising Smith Guidelines, infra). The Guidelines plainly state that "the standard of 'reasonable
indication' is substantially lower than probable cause." Id. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 245
n.13 (1983), the Court made clear that probable cause under the Fourth Amendment does not require a
prima facie indication of criminal behavior, all that is needed is a "probability or substantial chance" of
criminality. Reasonable suspicion, of course, is a lower threshold than probable cause.
The Guidelines explain, however, that a "preliminary inquiry" may be initiated in circumstances that
do not warrant a full investigation:
On some occasions the FBI may receive information or an allegation not warranting a full
investigation-because there is not yet a "reasonable indication" of criminal activities-but
whose responsible handling requires some further scrutiny beyond the prompt and extremely
limited checking out of initial leads. In such circumstances, though the factual predicate for
an investigation has not been met, the FBI may initiate an "inquiry" involving some measured
review, contact, or observation activities in response to the allegation or information
indicating the possibility of criminal activity.
Id § l.B(l), at 4.
For a preliminary inquiry, the Guidelines permit the use of informants and the consensual
monitoring of telephone conversations, pen registers, and beepers as proper "lawful investigative
technique[s]" subject to the approval of a supervising agent. Id. § II.B(6), at 6; Id. §§ IV.B(12)-.B(5),
at 16-17; see also Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Attorney General on The Attorney General's
Guidelines (AGG) on Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Undercover Operations (Oct. 28, 1992)
(on file with author).
Thus, two things are clear about the Guidelines. First, the government's definition of a
"reasonable indication" of crime is "substantially lower probable cause." Second, the FBI is allowed to
use informants and other self-described "highly intrusive" investigative techniques even in
cireumstances that do not satisfy the very low standard of a "reasonable indication" of criminal
conduct.
This interpretation of the Guidelines was confirmed by the statement of then-FBI Director William
Webster in testimony to Congress. See Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic Security
Investigations (Smith Guidelines): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 23, 25-26 (1983) (statement of William H. Webster,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation); see also Elliff, supra, at 806-07 (discussing the Guidelines
and similar, earlier congressional testimony of William H. Webster in 1982); cf. KATZMANN, supra
note II, at 79-80 (quoting congressional testimony from Assistant Attorney General Phillip B.
Heymann, who stated that undercover operations are initiated only when the government "reasonably
suspect[s]" that a crime will occur or perceives "reasonable indications" of criminal activity).
310. Kitch, supra note 253, at 142. Professor Kitch has stated that "[tlhe Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement can be used to control abuses of electronic surveillance, but it would effectively
prevent altogether the use of informers and secret agents." Id
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opposition to court-sanctioned electronic surveillance" As an abstract
matter, this complaint is not without merit. But Fourth Amendment
safeguards often take a beating when the Amendment is viewed as an "all-or-
nothing" proposition. Moreover, defenders of the Fourth Amendment must
heed Professor Kamisar's warning that sophisticated legal arguments must be
capable of working in both directions.31
If a comprehensive wiretapping law can be structured in a manner
consistent with the demands of the particularity requirement, there is no
apparent reason why informant spying cannot be subjected to similar
constitutional restraint.3 Application of the particularity rule to informants
will limit the unbridled and open-ended intrusions that often occur with
informant spying.314
Some, however, have argued that traditional constitutional safeguards
should not be applied to informant spying.31 The costs to effective law
enforcement would be too burdensome, especially when certain "types of
crime are particularly difficult to investigate because their perpetrators are
311. See Osbom v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 353 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also
EDITH J. LAPIDUS, EAVESDROPPING ON TRIAL 193 (1974) (relating Justice Douglas's opposition to
wiretapping and bugging in Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 61 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)); Schwartz, Electronic Eavesdropping, supra note 307, at 457-73.
312. The [A]mendment does call for a warrant "particularly describing" the "things to be
seized." However, if to rule that conversations are not "papers" or "effects" or capable of
being "seized" is to read the tF]ourth [A]mendment "with the literalness of a country parson
interpreting the first chapter of Genesis," to contend on the other hand that such conversations
are not only constitutionally protected, but incapable of being "particularly described" in
advance, and therefore beyond the reach of any court order, is not to display much more
sophistication. Surely wiretapping opponents do not have to be reminded that "it is a
Constitution we are expounding."
Kamisar, supra note 92, at 912-13 (footnotes omitted).
313. See Kent Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping & Eavesdropping: Surreptitious
Monitoring with the Consent of a Participant in a Conversation, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 189, 230 (1968)
(stating that in monitoring informants, "a high degree of specificity ... will be possible and ... the
monitoring of extraneous conversations can be kept to a minimum").
314. See, e.g., Baldwin v. United States, 450 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1981) (denial of cert.) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a six-month informant search of a home "undertaken for the general purpose
of gathering any incriminating evidence rather than the specific purpose of seizing certain
incriminating documents," violated the Fourth Amendment).
315. George E. Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TFX. L. REV. 203, 220
(1975). Professor Dix has observed that the traditional probable cause rule of the Fourth Amendment
should not control undercover operations.
The invasion of personal security involved in undercover surveillance is less direct than that
involved in a traditional search or arrest. Furthermore, ... [undercover surveillance] should
be available to secure evidence necessary to make arrests or conduct traditional searches;
therefore, an evidentiary standard less stringent than that required for those actions is
appropriate.
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able to restrict sharply the traces of criminal activity they leave behind." 6 Of
course, similar claims were raised when Congress and the Court considered
restricting discretionary electronic surveillance. And even when some states
enacted absolute prohibitions on wiretapping, police officers still employed it
for investigatory purposes and as a tool to obtain "leads." '  Long before
Congress adopted detailed regulations, law enforcement officials who
opposed wiretapping conceded that electronic surveillance was often essential
for certain prosecutions.1 8
As late as the 1970s, the FBI stubbornly refused to acknowledge that its
electronic surveillance activities were subject to constitutional norms.319
"Wiretapping has been a standard technique throughout the [FBI]'s history.
Indeed, in the early years, ... it was the agency's single most useful
intelligence-gathering tool."'32 Notwithstanding the many benefits that
wiretapping holds for law enforcement officials, the Court recognized that
unless the traditional safeguards of the Fourth Amendment are followed, "the
conversations of any and all persons coming into the area covered by
[electronic surveillance] will be seized indiscriminately and without regard to
their connection with the crime under investigation."32'
The traditional safeguards of the Fourth Amendment will (and should)
apply to informant spying in the same way they apply to electronic
surveillance. Thus, the probable cause rule, which partially helps to deter the
promiscuous and rampant intrusions inherent in wiretapping, will also check
the intrusions associated with informant spying. As in wiretapping and
bugging, the probable cause requirement defines and limits the person,
316. Philip B. Heymann, Understanding Criminal Investigations, 22 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 315, 333
(1985).
317. See Kamisar, supra note 92, at 905; see also Westin, supra note 110, at 172. In 1938, the
regulations of the Department of Treasury prohibited all wiretapping. WESTIN, supra note 304, at 121.
This rule was re-issued regularly in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. Id. Nevertheless, Treasury agents
routinely ignored the rule for several decades and engaged in extensive wiretapping and bugging
throughout the nation. Id. at 121-25.
318. See Karnisar, supra note 92, at 900 n.49 (quoting the statement of former Senator Thomas F.
Eagleton, who at the time was a St.Louis prosecutor); see also Wiretapping, Eavesdropping, and the
Bill of Rights: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the
Judiciary United States Senate Pursuant to S. Res. 234, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 259 (1958) (statement of
Thomas F. Eagleton, Circuit Attorney, City of St. Louis, MO).
319. See ELLIFF, supra note 279, at 7 ("FBI officials had believed for many years that legal
standards did not govern collecting intelligence if the information was not used in a criminal
prosecution. The operating premise was that, so long as the government was not gathering evidence for
prosecution, its intelligence techniques need not adhere to constitutional requirements.").
320. JEFFREYS, supra note 15, at 199.
321. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,59 (1967).
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location, conversation, and time period targeted for surveillance.
The so-called "sound tactical reasons"322 for exempting informant spying
from compliance with the probable cause rule mostly promote law
enforcement efficiency concerns and have little, if any, connection to
constitutional values.Y Objections to the probable cause rule stem from the
view that "[i]f the requirement of probable cause were applied accurately, law
enforcement agencies would need grounds to arrest the subject for past
offenses before they could begin the undercover investigation.... Grounds
for arrest should not be required for an investigation that is clearly intended to
precede arrest.
324
Of course, a similar objection can be (and has been) lodged against the
restrictions on police wiretaps and bugs.325 But defenders of the federal
wiretapping law readily acknowledge that the probable cause requirement of
Title III-mandated by the holdings in Berger and Katz-was formulated to
address "those [constitutional] problems which might otherwise make
electronic surveillance indiscriminate and inordinately prolonged."326 Indeed,
322. Goldsmith, supra note 114, at 46.
323. In a 1976 report, the National Wiretap Commission listed several factors that counseled
against imposing a probable cause requirement for informant spying. According to the Commission, if
a probable cause role applied, law enforcement officials would be unable to confirm the "veracity and
credibility" of informants of dubious backgrounds, handicapped in "protect[ing] the agent or
informant" who is placed in a dangerous situation, and restricted in their "mobility and flexibility" in
protecting agents and in coordinating "raids and related activities." Goldsmith, supra note 114, at 46
n.289 (quoting NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE REVIEW OF FED. AND STATE LAWS RELATED TO
WIRETAPPING AND ELEC. SURVEILLANCE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 113-14 (1976) [hereinafter ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE]). The
Commission also noted that wiring an informant, especially in cases where political corruption is
alleged, may benefit the suspected target. "Not infrequently, persons making such charges withdraw
them when asked to be wired. In such circumstances, the official is protected, and it has been
suggested that elimination of consensual surveillance would adversely affect innocent people and
potential defendants as much as it would harm law enforcement." Id. (quoting ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE, supra, at 114 (footnotes omitted)).
None of the factors noted by the Commission promote interests served by the Fourth Amendment
All but the last factor are concerned with police efficiency. Admittedly, forcing a source to wear a wire
might reveal the dubious nature of certain allegations. This benefit to the innocent. however, is not a
reason for eliminating the probable cause requirement. It merely demonstrates the need for careful
screening by law enforcement officers prior to launching undercover operations that jeopardize the
privacy and security of innocent persons. The probable cause requirement serves the same goal.
324. Dix, supra note 315, at 223 n.34.
325. Cf. MCGEE & DUFFY, supra note 17, at 71-76 (relating the objection of the U.S. Attorney's
Office in Miami to the Department of Justice Criminal Division's rejection of an application to wiretap
public pay phones based on insufficient probable cause).
326. Goldsmith, supra note 114, at 51; cf. Michael Goldsmith, Eavesdropping Reform: The
Legality ofRoving Surveillance, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 401, 427 ("Roving [electronic] surveillance is
justified by law enforcement needs only when a crime has clearly been or is about to be committed. In
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many of the constitutional evils that the Court saw in discretionary
wiretapping are extant where the police decide for themselves when to
infiltrate a home or record private conversation with an informant. The
constitutional requirements of probable cause, particularity, minimization and
necessity-all vital elements for a valid wiretap or electronic bug327-- can and
should be applied to informant spying.
IV. CONCLUSION
In describing the dilemma often created by the Fourth Amendment, the
Fourth Circuit remarked that "[o]ne who would defend the Fourth
Amendment must share his foxhole with scoundrels of every sort, but to
abandon the post because of the poor company is to sell freedom cheaply."32
The defendants in the informant cases were certainly "scoundrels." Although
they were scoundrels, their Fourth Amendment claims were the arguments of
"Everyman.5 329
Perhaps a more plain-speaking comparison will illustrate the error of the
Court's post-Gouled informant cases. A few years ago Justice Scalia
reminded us:
It is privacy that is protected by the Fourth Amendment, not
solitude. A man enjoys Fourth Amendment protection in his home,
for example, even though his wife and children have the run of the
place-and indeed, even though his landlord has the right to
conduct unannounced inspections at any time. Similarly, in my
view, one's personal office is constitutionally protected against
warrantless intrusions by the police, even though employer and co-
workers are not excluded. 30
Justice Scalia's logic is equally pertinent here. A home or private
view of this fact, Congress should amend Title Ml to allow roving surveillance only in cases where
there is clear and convincing evidence of a predicate crime." (footnote omitted)).
327. See Goldsmith, supra note 114, at 51-53, 98, 126; Daniel F. Cook, Note, Electronic
Surveillance, Title M1I, and the Requirement ofNecessity, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 571, 577-86 (1975)
(asserting that Title M's necessity requirement is derived from the constitutional holdings in Berger
and Katz).
328. Kopf v. Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374, 379-80 (4th Cir. 1993). Thanks to my colleague Professor
Kathryn R. Urbonya for pointing me to the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Kopf See Kathryn R. Urbonya,
Dangerous Misperceptions: Protecting Police Officers, Society, and the Fourth Amendment Right to
Personal Security, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 623, 627 n.13 (1995).
329. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
330. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 730 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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conversation should not lose its constitutional protection against promiscuous
police intrusion merely because an individual has allowed a third party's
presence. When it comes to Fourth Amendment rights, the difference
between the police and everyone else matters.
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